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A RETURN TO EYES ON THE PRIZE:
LITIGATING UNDER THE RESTORED NEW
YORK CITY HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
Craig Gurian ∗
“The Legislature, by enacting an amendment of a statute changing the
language thereof, is deemed to have intended a material change in the
law.”
—New York Statutes, Construction of Amendments 1
“The courts in construing a statute should consider the mischief sought to
be remedied by the new legislation, and they should construe the act in
question so as to suppress the evil and advance the remedy.”
—New York Statutes, Construction of Amendments 2

INTRODUCTION
Fifteen years ago, in 1991, New York City enacted comprehensive
reforms to its local Human Rights Law3 in order to fight a civil rights
counter-revolution that was already restricting civil rights protections on
the national level.4 These reforms never achieved their potential, a failure
∗

Executive Director of the Anti-Discrimination Center of Metro New York; Scholar-inResidence, Fordham Law School’s Stein Center for Law and Ethics; and Adjunct Associate
Professor of Law at Fordham Law School. Professor Gurian was the principal drafter of the
Local Civil Rights Restoration Act and built and led a coalition of more than forty civil
rights and allied groups that worked for its passage. This article is dedicated to Lori, Mollie,
Alison, and Nico.
1. N.Y. STAT. LAW § 193(a) (McKinney 2005).
2. Id. § 95.
3. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 8 (1991). These amendments (“1991 Amendments”) are
found in NEW YORK CITY LEGISLATIVE ANNUAL 145–81 (1991). [hereinafter 1991 LEG.
ANN.]. The 1991 Amendments resulted from passage of Local Law 39 of 1991, available at
www.antibiaslaw.com/LL39.pdf. Title 8 of the Administrative Code is popularly known as
the “City Human Rights Law.” Except where otherwise specified, references to Title 8 refer
to the provisions of the City Human Rights Law as they existed once the 1991 Amendments
had been enacted.
4. In 1991, the United States was in the third year of generally conservative judicial
appointments by President George Herbert Walker Bush, an administration that followed
directly eight years of highly conservative appointments by President Ronald Reagan. The
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due, in significant measure, to the unwillingness of judges to engage in an
independent analysis of what interpretation of the City Human Rights Law
would best effectuate the purposes of that law.5 This unwillingness has not
been an isolated phenomenon. On the contrary, virtually every judge who
has presided over a City Human Rights Law matter has simply asserted that
the City Human Rights Law was nothing more than a carbon copy of its
federal and state counterparts. 6
The recent enactment of the Local Civil Rights Restoration Act
(“Restoration Act”) 7 reflects the New York City Council’s concern that the
City Human Rights Law “has been construed too narrowly.” 8 The law
explicitly rejects the “carbon copy” theory: “In particular, through passage
of this local law, the Council seeks to underscore that the provisions of
New York City’s Human Rights Law are to be construed independently
from similar or identical provisions of New York state or federal statutes.” 9
The Restoration Act proceeds along two basic tracks. One track consists
of a series of amendments to particular sections of the law. These
amendments are significant in and of themselves and in terms of
understanding the direction in which the Council wishes to see the law
proceed. These amendments expand retaliation protection, raise the
maximum civil penalties that may be awarded in proceedings brought

concern from those who believed in vigorous civil rights enforcement was not limited to
national developments: “Even on the state level,” then Mayor David N. Dinkins stated,
“narrow interpretations of civil rights laws have retarded progress.” Remarks by Mayor
David N. Dinkins at Public Hearing on Local Laws 1 (June 18, 1991) [hereinafter Mayor
David N. Dinkins, Remarks] (on file with the New York City Council’s Committee on
General Welfare), available at www.antibiaslaw.com/MayorsRemarks061891.pdf.
5. In fairness, advocates for victims of discrimination must also take responsibility for
the stunted state of City Human Rights Law. On far too many occasions, courts have not
been asked to engage in this independent analysis.
6. More often than not, the assertion is set out in a footnote. When the assertion is in
the body of a decision, the proposition is set out in brief, conclusory terms without any
discussion. E.g., Payne v. MTA New York City Transit Authority, 349 F. Supp. 2d 619,
629 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (“Since claims brought under the State HRL and City HRL are
analyzed under the same substantive standards as claims brought under Title VII, summary
judgment is granted in favor of defendant with respect to [plaintiff’s] state and local law
claims, as well.”).
7. N.Y.C. LOCAL LAW NO. 85 OF 2005 (Oct. 3, 2005) [hereinafter Restoration Act].
The Restoration Act is found in NEW YORK CITY, LEGISLATIVE ANNUAL (2005)
(forthcoming).
The
text
of the
Restoration
Act
is
available
at
www.antibiaslaw.com/RestorationAct.pdf. The Restoration Act was signed into law on
October 3, 2005, to be effective immediately. For an analysis of which provisions of the
Restoration Act are to be given retroactive effect, see discussion infra notes 337–350 and
accompanying text.
8. Restoration Act, supra note 7, § 1.
9. Id.
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administratively, 10 protect domestic partners against all forms of
discrimination proscribed by the law, 11 require administrative
investigations to be thorough, and restore the availability of attorney’s fees
in catalyst cases. I defer exploration of these amendments until Part II of
this article only because it is the Restoration Act’s other track that is
intended to be transformative.
That second track is designed to eliminate the mechanism by which
judges have failed to give the local law the expansive interpretation that the
Council has intended. The Act states that provisions of state and federal
civil rights statutes should be viewed “as a floor below which the City’s
Human Rights law cannot fall, rather than a ceiling above which the local
law cannot rise.” 12 This ought not be a revolutionary proposition. That
idea, after all, has found explicit statutory expression for forty years.13
Nevertheless, the reality is that there has been very little independent
development of the local law, even in circumstances where the language of
a specific City Human Rights Law provision varies from that of its federal
or state counterpart. 14
The Act also amends section 8-130, the construction provision of the
City’s Human Rights Law, something the 1991 amendments had not done.
In so doing, the Restoration Act takes direct aim at the premises and
practices that have underlain interpretations of the statute.
The
construction provision—which is an operative provision as much as any
other section of the law—is revised as follows (additions italicized;
deletions bracketed):
The provisions of this [chapter] title shall be construed liberally for the
accomplishment of the uniquely broad and remedial purposes thereof,
regardless of whether federal or New York State civil and human rights
laws, including those laws with provisions comparably-worded to
provisions of this title, have been so construed. 15

10. Unlike Title VII, the City Human Rights Law permits an aggrieved party to seek
administrative enforcement through the City’s Human Rights Commission or judicial
enforcement through the bringing of a court action. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE §§ 8-109, 8502(a). Judicial actions may be brought directly; administrative filing is not a prerequisite.
Id. Rather than civil penalties, judicial actions provide for uncapped punitive damages. Id.
11. The City Human Rights Law’s proscriptions include those barring discrimination in
employment, housing, and public accommodations.
12. Restoration Act, supra note 7, § 1.
13. See, e.g., Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (2005); Title II, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-6(b)
(2005) (proscriptions against discrimination in public accommodations); Fair Housing Act,
42 U.S.C. § 3615 (2005); Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12201(b) (2005).
14. See discussion infra notes 33–90 and accompanying text.
15. Restoration Act, supra note 7, § 7.
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Assertions that the purposes of the City Human Rights Law are no
broader than those other civil rights laws are simply not tenable in the face
of this amendment. Likewise, the practice of robotically importing
interpretations of federal and state civil rights statutes is inconsistent with
the demand that liberal construction analysis must be performed without
the result of that analysis being restricted or supplanted by the fact that
federal and New York state civil rights laws have reached a result less
friendly to victims of discrimination.
There are three crucial consequences of the Restoration Act’s
declaration of independence. First, there will be no warrant to ratchet
down the protections of the City Human Rights Law in the likely event that
federal and state civil rights protections are constricted further.16 Indeed,
the legislative history of the Restoration Act makes clear that the Council
thought that federal and state civil rights laws had, by 1991, already been
narrowed too far.
Second, areas of the law that have been treated as settled under City
Human Rights Law, because they are settled for purposes of the
counterpart statutes, will now be reopened for argument and analysis. This
result follows directly from the Restoration Act’s intention that decisions
that have failed to construe City Human Rights Law provisions
independently and robustly are not to be treated as controlling, and may
only be afforded persuasive weight in limited circumstances. 17 As such,
advocates will be able to argue afresh (or for the first time) a wide range of
issues under the City’s Human Rights Law, including the parameters of
actionable sexual harassment, the vitality of protection against
discrimination on the basis of marital status, the availability of a remedy for
those persons with disabilities who need what the Second Circuit has
characterized as “economic accommodations,” and the appropriate scope of
damages.
Third—and this consequence is, unfortunately, of more moment than
might at first be apparent—the Restoration Act’s removal of the crutch of
assumed equivalence will persuade more judges to take a look at the actual
language of specific provisions of the City’s Human Rights Law. Doing so
will cause them to see more differences with federal and state law—
including differences in the areas of individual liability, vicarious liability,
punitive damages, availability of compensatory damages in mixed motive
cases, the nature of burden shifting in disparate impact cases, the scope of
16. This will mean, for example, that the broad standing that currently exists for fair
housing organizations will not be able to be abridged. See discussion infra notes 274–285
and accompanying text.
17. See discussion infra notes 91-116 and accompanying text.
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“public accommodations,” and the obligation of a housing provider to
make and pay for reasonable modifications—than they have previously
taken the time to recognize.
It turns out—as the legislative history of the Restoration Act
demonstrates—that the City Council had all three consequences
unmistakably in view when passing the bill.18 Will judges, consistent with
the principles of statutory construction cited at the head of this article, be
prepared to recognize that the City Council “intended a material change in
the law,” even where the changes are more far-reaching than they
themselves would have enacted? Will they consider the “mischief to be
remedied by the new legislation,” even if they personally believe that the
remedy is actually the mischief? Will they “construe the act in question so
as to suppress the evil and advance the remedy,” even if their own views of
what discrimination law should be are aptly summarized by the motto:
“defendants are already too burdened”? No legislation ever devised has
provided a one hundred percent guarantee against judicial lawlessness, and
so an article written in the immediate aftermath of the passage of the
Restoration Act cannot set forth the answers to these questions with
certainty.
Some things are clear, however. Any judge who takes seriously the
principle that a court must honor the will of the legislature now faces a new
reality and an important challenge. The need today for the development of
the provisions of the City Human Rights Law by the process of judicial
decision-making is not unlike the need for the development of the
provisions of Title VII by the process of judicial decision-making which
followed the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 19 Any civil rights
advocate who is dispirited with national developments can seek to take
advantage of the opportunities for the expansion of civil rights protections
offered by the Restoration Act: (1) directly in New York City, by
embarking on litigation that has been effectively foreclosed elsewhere; or
(2) in other states and municipalities where there is the political will to
insist that anti-discrimination laws be interpreted robustly, by seeking to
pass similar legislation to make real the protections of civil rights law.
President Lincoln said—140 years ago—“let us strive on to finish the
work we are in.” 20 That task is still not completed; it is time that we got

18. See discussion infra notes 21–25 and accompanying text.
19. It is true that many aspects of federal anti-discrimination law that were entirely
developed by judicial interpretation are handled by specific statutory provisions of the City
Human Rights Law. Even so, remarkably few provisions of City Human Rights Law have
received thoughtful and independent analysis at any time.
20. President Abraham Lincoln, Second Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1865).
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back to work.
PART I: BROAD, ROBUST, AND INDEPENDENT INTERPRETATION
A. Sources for Construction
To understand the intent and consequences of the Restoration Act, one
begins, of course, with the text of the statute itself,21 but one must also
consider the Act’s legislative history. One key source was the report
submitted to the full Council by the Committee on General Welfare, the
committee from which the Restoration Act emerged. 22
Another key source was statements made when the full Council
considered and passed the bill at its meeting of September 15, 2005. At
that meeting, Council Member Annabel Palma, a member of the
Committee on General Welfare, brought the attention of her colleagues to
the intent and consequences of the legislation:
Insisting that our local law be interpreted broadly and independently will
safeguard New Yorkers at a time when federal and state civil rights
protections are in jeopardy.
There are many illustrations of cases, like Levin on marital status,
Priore[,] McGrath and Forrest that have either failed to interpret the City
Human Rights Law to fulfill its uniquely broad purposes, ignore the text
of specific provisions of the law, or both.
With Intro. 22, these cases and others like them, will no longer hinder the
vindication of our civil rights.
The work of the Anti-Discrimination Center was particularly important to
the development and passage of this bill, and its testimony is an excellent
guide to the intent and consequences of legislation we pass today.
Statements from the Brennan Center and the Association of the Bar were
also important to the Committee. I have copies of all three and invite my
colleagues to take a look at them and review them.
And I would also like that a copy of each be placed in the record for

21. The Restoration Act was introduced as “Int. 22” (in the nomenclature of the City
Council, a bill is referred to by its “Intro” number); the amended version that was passed by
the Committee and then by the Council was referred to as “Int. 22-A.”
22. COMM. ON GEN. WELFARE, REPORT ON PROP. INT. NO. 22-A (Aug. 17, 2005)
COMMITTEE
REPORT],
available
at
[hereinafter
2005
http://antibiaslaw.com/CommitteeReport081705.pdf. The 2005 COMMITTEE REPORT is
found in the 2005 New York City Legislative Annual. NEW YORK CITY, LEGISLATIVE
ANNUAL (2005) (forthcoming).
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today’s Stated Meeting. 23

In addition to the Center Testimony, Brennan Statement, and Bar Letter
referred to in the referred to in Council Member Palma’s statement
regarding the intent and consequences of the legislation—the items directly
and explicitly brought to the full Council’s attention before the vote on the
bill—additional testimony had been taken at General Welfare Committee
hearings from a variety of civil rights and allied groups who supported the
bill. 24
Finally, it is clear that the thrust of the 1991 amendments to the City’s
Human Rights Law needs to be considered if one is to understand the
Restoration Act: “Prop. Int. 22-A,” explains the 2005 Committee Report,
aims to ensure construction of the City’s Human Rights Law in line with
the purposes of the fundamental amendments to the law enacted in 1991.”25
What is striking about each of these sources—the Restoration Act’s text,
the 2005 Committee Report, Council Member statements, the testimony
and statements cited to the full Council, additional hearing testimony, and
the 1991 Amendments—is that they are all remarkably consistent. In short,
they convey, individually and in the aggregate, a vision that the City’s

23. Annabel Palma, Statement at the Meeting of the New York City Council 41–42
(Sept. 15, 2005) (transcript on file with the office of the New York City Clerk). Council
Member Bill deBlasio, the Chair of the Committee on General Welfare, emphasized that
“localities have to stand up for their own visions” of “how we protect the rights of the
individual,” regardless of federal and state restrictiveness. Bill deBlasio, Statement at the
Meeting of the New York City Council 47 (Sept. 15, 2005) (transcript on file with the New
York City Clerk’s Office). Council Member Gale Brewer, the chief sponsor of the
Restoration Act, stated that she wanted to reiterate the comments of Council Members
Palma and deBlasio, and that it was important to make sure that civil rights protections “are
stronger here than [under] the State or federal law.” Gale Brewer, Statement at the Meeting
of the New York City Council 48–49 (Sept. 15, 2005) (transcript on file with the New York
City Clerk’s Office).
Council Member Palma was referring to the testimony of the Anti-Discrimination
Center, dated April 14, 2005 [hereinafter Center Testimony] (on file with the New York
City
Council’s
Committee
on
General
Welfare),
available
at
www.antibiaslaw.com/CenterTestimony041405.pdf; the Statement of the Brennan Center
for Justice, dated July 8, 2005 [hereinafter Brennan Center Statement] (on file with the New
York
City
Council’s
Committee
on
General
Welfare),
available
at
www.antibiaslaw.com/BrennanStatement070805.pdf; and a letter from the Association of
the Bar, dated August 1, 2005 [hereinafter Bar Association Letter], (on file with the New
York
City
Council’s
Committee
on
General
Welfare),
available
at
www.antibiaslaw.com/BarAssociationLetter080105/pdf. The cases she referred to are:
Levin v. Yeshiva Univ., 754 N.E.2d 1099 (N.Y. 2001); Priore v. N.Y. Yankees, 761 N.Y.S.2d
608 (App. Div. 2003); McGrath v. Toys “R” Us, Inc., 821 N.E.2d 519 (N.Y. 2004); and
Forrest v. Jewish Guild for the Blind, 819 N.E.2d 998 (N.Y. 2004).
24. Ironically, the only testimony against the bill at any of its hearings was that from
representatives of the New York City Commission on Human Rights.
25. 2005 COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 22, at 2.
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Human Rights Law must meld the broadest vision of social justice with the
strongest law enforcement deterrent, and that the judges interpreting the
law take its protections to the furthest reaches of what is constitutionally
permissible.
B. The Mischief to be Remedied
Federal and state courts routinely import federal or state standards when
dealing with a city’s human rights law, a practice that has continued
unabated over the years. 26
The practice of automatic importation—or rote parallelism—undermines
proper administration of the City Human Rights Law. The practice was
unwarranted for three principal reasons, which are discussed in turn below.
1. Rote parallelism disregards the City’s intent
in passing the 1991 Amendments
The legislative history of the 1991 Amendments explicitly conveyed the
local desire to have the City Human Rights Law construed robustly. For
example, then Mayor Dinkins stated that “it is the intention of the council
that judges interpreting the City’s Human Rights Law are not to be bound
by restrictive state and federal rulings and are to take seriously the
requirement that this law be liberally and independently construed.”27
The Committee Report that accompanied the 1991 Amendments, noting
that the legislation would “put the city’s law at the forefront of human
rights laws,” went on to state that, “[f]aced with restrictive interpretations
of human rights laws on the state and federal levels, it is especially
significant that the city has seen fit to strengthen the local human rights law
at this time.” 28 It also stated that “particular attention should be given” to
the construction section of the law.29

26. See e.g., Mack v. Otis Elevator Co., 326 F.3d 116, 122 n.2 (2d Cir. 2000) (“Our
consideration of claims brought under the state and city human rights law parallels the
analysis used in Title VII claims.”) (quoting Cruz v. Coach Stores, Inc., 202 F.3d 560, 565
n.1 (2d. Cir. 2000)), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1016 (2003); Forrest v. Jewish Guild for the
Blind, 819 N.E.2d 998, 1007 n.3 (N.Y 2004) (internal citations omitted) (“The standards for
recovery under the New York State Human Rights Law . . . are the same as the federal
standards under [T]itle VII. . . . Further, the human rights provisions of the New York City
Administrative Code mirror the provisions of the [State Human Rights Law] and should
therefore be analyzed according to the same standards.”).
27. Mayor David N. Dinkins, Remarks, supra note 4, at 1.
28. COMM. ON GEN. WELFARE, REPORT ON PROP. INT. NO. 465-A AND PROP. INT. NO.
536-A 12 (1991) [hereinafter 1991 COMMITTEE REPORT] (on file with Committee), available
at www.antibiaslaw.com/LL39CommitteeReport.pdf.
29. Id.
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Unfortunately, the Council made no changes to the text of the
construction provision itself except to remove language dealing with the
issue of election of remedies. 30 This meant that there was no ready textual
flag in the law to alert judges that a different regime was intended. Worse,
because there was no private right of action under the City Human Rights
Law until the enactment of the 1991 Amendments, and because judicial
actions were not permitted to be commenced until nine months thereafter,31
the temptation was overwhelming to shy away from developing a new body
of law, and instead to rely on what had been twenty eight years of
development of federal employment discrimination law and twenty four
years of development of federal housing discrimination law, not to mention
an even longer period during which the provisions of the State Human
Rights Law and the City Human Rights Law were, in fact, largely identical.
The lack of modifications to the text of the construction provision gave
the State Court of Appeals a means by which to ignore the intention of the
1991 Amendments: the court ultimately dismissed the language of the
Committee Report cited above as statements which “merely reflect the
broad policy behind the local law to discourage discrimination.”32
2. Rote parallelism ignores the liberal construction
that has long been required
The “liberal construction” requirement was not a new invention of the
1991 Amendments. The requirement, as mentioned earlier, had already
been a part of the City Human Rights Law. An identically-worded
requirement had long been incorporated into the State Human Rights
Law. 33 Indeed, in interpreting cases arising under the State Human Rights
Law, the Court of Appeals used to recognize that: “Analysis starts by
recognizing that the provisions of the Human Rights Law must be liberally
construed to accomplish the purposes of the statute . . . .” 34
The idea that federal civil rights laws provide a floor below which other
laws cannot fall, not a ceiling above which they can rise, is not a new
invention either. Title VII, for example, provides that:

30. The provision, previously codified as section 8-112 of the New York City Human
Rights Law, was redenominated section 8-130. See 1991 LEG. ANN., supra note 3, at 175.
31. 1991 Amendments, supra note 4, § 4(7); 1991 LEG. ANN., supra note 3, at 180.
32. McGrath v. Toys “R” Us, Inc., 821 N.E.2d 519, 524–25 (N.Y. 2004) (citing Krohn
v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 811 N.E.2d 8, 12 (N.Y. 2004)). The City Council’s rejection of the
premises of McGrath, and its rejection of McGrath’s mechanism for analyzing cases, is
discussed at length. See infra notes 91–120 and 154–165 and accompanying text.
33. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 300 (McKinney 2005).
34. Cahill v. Rosa, 674 N.E.2d 274, 276 (N.Y. 1996).
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Nothing in this subchapter shall be deemed to exempt or relieve any
person from any liability, duty, penalty, or punishment provided by any
present or future law of any State or political subdivision of a state, other
than any such law which purports to require or permit the doing of any act
which would be an unlawful employment practice under this
subchapter. 35

Sometimes, federal law has been used to provide useful guidance
consistent with the liberal construction requirement. In In re Aurecchione
v. New York State Division of Human Rights, for example, the Court of
Appeals examined the question of whether pre-determination interest was
available under the State Human Rights Law, notwithstanding the fact that
the law makes no explicit reference to pre-determination interest.36 In the
context of recognizing that “a liberal reading of the statute is mandated to
effectuate the statute’s intent,” 37 the Court of Appeals itself considered
what result would best further the State Human Rights Law’s purpose of
making a victim whole. Reviewing a Supreme Court case that considered
Title VII’s purpose in making a victim whole,38 the Court of Appeals noted
that federal case law in this area “proves helpful to the resolution of this
appeal,” 39 and ruled that the award of pre-judgment interest was
appropriate in the case.
The problem is that the seeking of guidance has morphed into rote
parallelism, diverting judges from the task of determining what
interpretation of the statute best achieves its purposes.
Whereas
Aurrecchione drew on a federal case because that federal case persuasively
addressed the “make whole” relief about which the Court of Appeals was
concerned, 40 the Court of Appeals ignored the statutory obligation of
liberal construction altogether in the case of McGrath v. Toys “R” Us,

35. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (2005); see also §§ 2000a-6(b) (public accommodations
provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); 3615 (Fair Housing Act); 12201(b) (Americans
with Disabilities Act).
36. In re Aurecchione v. N.Y. State Div. of Human Rights, 771 N.E.2d 231, 233 (N.Y.
2002).
37. Id. at 233.
38. Loeffler v. Frank, 486 U.S. 549, 558 (1988).
39. Aurecchione, 771 N.E.2d at 233. The Court of Appeals in Aurecchione (albeit in the
context of comparing federal law with State not City Human Rights Law) was already
relying on a consistent interpretation of state and federal civil rights laws in view of broad
areas of similarity between them. In Aurecchione, though, the Court was still looking at the
purposes of the State Human Rights Law. Id. (“Clearly, a central concern of the Human
Rights Law is to make . . . victims ‘whole’.”).
40. Aurecchione did foreshadow later problems with its uncritical references to federal
and state law being “textually similar and ultimately employ[ing] the same standards of
recovery.” Id.
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Inc. 41 The court simply assumed that the purposes of federal civil rights
law were the same as those of the City Human Rights Law, ignored the fact
that the United States Supreme Court case being imported had not
examined or purported to examine what result would best fulfill the
purposes of federal civil rights law, and did not itself engage in examining
the consequences of its ruling on the rights of people who could prove they
had been subject to discrimination.
McGrath was a case which posed the question of what standard to apply
regarding the award of attorney’s fees where a plaintiff who had proved
discrimination to the satisfaction of a jury was only awarded nominal
damages. When the City Council passed the 1991 Amendments by which a
private right of action was created, and simultaneously enacted an
attorney’s fee provision in connection with that private right of action,42 it
was acting in the shadow of the Second Circuit’s then longstanding view
that attorney’s fees were available in nominal damages cases. 43
A year after the City Council had acted, the Supreme Court, in its 5-4
Farrar decision, sharply cut back on the availability of attorney’s fees in
cases which result in nominal damages only. 44 While the Supreme Court
acknowledged that the plaintiff who had won a liability verdict was a
“prevailing party,” the majority concluded that where the prevailing party
only is awarded nominal damages, “the only reasonable fee is usually no
fee at all.” 45
Despite the fact that the City Council could not have had the Supreme
Court’s not-yet-developed Farrar rule in mind, 46 the Court of Appeals in

41. 821 N.E.2d 519 (N.Y. 2004).
42. Previously, aggrieved parties could only proceed administratively, through the New
York City Commission on Human Rights.
43. E.g., Ruggiero v. Krzeminski, 928 F.2d 558, 564 (2d Cir. 1991) (decided March 18,
1991, just three months before the City Council amended the New York City Human Rights
Law) (“The jury’s determination that appellants’ fourth and fourteenth amendment rights
were violated by the search conducted by the Officers assuredly is significant. . . . Although
no compensatory damages were awarded, the jury’s determination ‘changes the legal
relationship’ between the Ruggieros and the Officers in that a violation of rights had been
found.”); McCann v. Coughlin, 698 F.2d 112, 128 (2d Cir. 1983) (“Our decisions indicate
that an award is not barred merely because the action was settled or the plaintiff was
awarded only nominal damages.”); Milwe v. Cavuoto, 653 F.2d 80, 84 (2d Cir. 1981)
(reversing district court denial of attorney’s fees award where plaintiff only won one dollar
in nominal damages on a § 1983 claim).
44. Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 115 (1992).
45. Id.
46. The Court of Appeals reluctantly acknowledged this: “Granted, it is not surprising
that the legislative history [of the 1991 Amendments] does not address the Farrar rule since
the amendments predated Farrar by one year.” McGrath, 3 N.Y.3d at 433.
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McGrath proceeded to import the Farrar standard. 47 The court’s principle
justification for doing so was based on its “general practice of interpreting
comparable civil rights statutes consistently, particularly since these broad
[state and city] policies are identical to those underlying the federal
statutes.” 48 The court also stated that, if the City Council had disagreed
with Farrar, it could have amended the City Human Rights Law to say
so. 49
The premises underlying the McGrath decision were faulty and
misguided, especially in an era of continuing cutbacks in the reach of
federal civil rights protections. As the Brennan Center pointed out to the
Council in urging support for the Restoration Act, “the court was wrong to
assume that the federal decision relied on had considered whether the
restrictive rule furthered the purposes of federal civil rights law.” 50 In fact,
the Supreme Court in Farrar did not ever address or purport to address the
question of whether its rule would help or hinder the enforcement of civil
rights protections. 51
Had any analysis been done of the role of attorney’s fees in civil rights
litigation, that analysis would have strongly suggested that the Farrar rule
did not accord with the purposes of federal civil rights law, let alone the
purposes of City Human Rights Law. The Senate Report on the Civil
Rights Attorney’s Fee Awards Act of 1976, for example, pointed out that a
variety of civil rights laws—including the public accommodations
provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (provisions which do not
provide for damages)—”depend heavily upon private enforcement, and fee
awards have proved an essential remedy if private citizens are to have a
meaningful opportunity to vindicate the important Congressional policies
which these laws contain.” 52 That report made plain how judges were to
proceed: “In the civil rights area, Congress has instructed the courts to use
the broadest and most effective remedies available to achieve the goals of
our civil rights laws.”53
It is difficult to understand how Farrar could accord with the intention

47. Id. at 434.
48. Id. at 433.
49. Id. at 433-34.
50. Brennan Center Statement, supra note 23, at 4.
51. If the Supreme Court had evaluated that issue, the Court of Appeals would still have
had the question of whether the Supreme Court’s evaluation was persuasive in determining
what rule met the purposes of the City Human Rights Law, but, in Farrar, there was not a
question of agreeing or disagreeing with the Supreme Court’s liberal construction
analysis—there simply, literally, was no liberal construction analysis.
52. S. REP. NO. 94-1011, at 5910 (1976).
53. Id. at 5910-11 (emphasis added).
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of Congress to use “the broadest and most effective remedies available.”
Nevertheless, because of the “general practice” of the Court of Appeals to
assume that there is federal and local equivalence, the court was blinded to
its obligation to scrutinize Farrar to see whether in fact the reasoning of
that decision was actually helpful in deciding the City Human Rights Law
case the Court of Appeals had before it. 54
So much was the Court of Appeals under the spell of rote parallelism, it
failed to conduct its own analysis of whether adopting the Farrar rule for
City Human Rights Law actions would further the purposes of the
counterpart guarantees contained in City law. Such an analysis would have
had to come to grips with the fact that the Council had in 1991 done the
exact opposite of narrowing the cases where fees would be available. It
created the private right of action (and accompanying attorney’s fee
provision), identified the goal of the City Human Rights Law as preventing
discrimination from playing “any role” in actions related to the various
activities covered by the law, identified individual prosecution as part of
the City’s overall effort to fight discrimination, referred to the availability
of fees without indicating that any subcategory of those who had proved
discrimination would be denied fees, and did all of these things in the
context of comprehensive reforms, all of which significantly expanded the
reach of the law.55
Liberal construction analysis would have had to come to grips with the
difficulties the Farrar rule imposes on persons seeking counsel to vindicate
their rights. Describing a case as a “nominal damages case” is an after-thefact construct. Attorneys, by contrast, need to make decisions about case
selection in real time, long before they know whether they will be able to
get a jury to award monetary damages. If proving liability is not sufficient
to warrant a fee award, they will be discouraged not only from taking on
cases where they “know” damages will not be awarded, but from taking on
any cases where, though they have no doubt about proving that a defendant
discriminated, they may have questions as to whether a plaintiff’s actual

54. The Court—and other automatic importers—has lost sight of the admonition made
almost thirty years ago by the late Supreme Court Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. Justice
Brennan, writing in the context of state constitutional provisions, cautioned that state court
judges “do well to scrutinize constitutional decisions by federal courts, for only if they are
found to be logically persuasive and well-reasoned, paying due regard to precedent and the
policies underlying specific constitutional guarantees, may they properly claim persuasive
weight as guideposts when interpreting counterpart state guarantees.” William J. Brennan,
Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 502
(1977) [hereinafter Brennan, Protecting Individual Rights]; see Brennan Center Statement,
supra note 23, at 8.
55. See 1991 LEG. ANN., supra note 4.
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damages will be recognized by a jury. 56
None of the foregoing was considered, and, as such, a rule was imported
without any court having ever engaged in the liberal construction analysis
that had been required by section 8-130 of the local Human Rights Law.
The Court of Appeals’ alternative suggestion that the City Council
could have changed the attorney’s fees provision—and, therefore, its
conclusion that the Council’s failure to do so represents an implicit
adoption of the ratcheted down federal standard—is both disingenuous and
detrimental to the efficient and effective operation of the City Human
Rights Law. The City Council had an explicit provision of law in place—
the construction requirement of section 8-130—that it was entitled to have
enforced. Both the Council and the Mayor had expressly noted the
importance of having that provision enforced. Each had said that federal
and state law were already too narrow as of 1991. Just because courts have
subsequently failed to meet their obligations to engage in liberal
construction analysis is no reason to suppose that the Council affirmatively
believed at any time that Farrar was the one area of federal law where the
City should go along with the federal civil rights rollback.
What the Court of Appeals was really doing in McGrath was providing a
formal announcement that the scope and content of the New York City
Human Rights Law would always be at the mercy of the latest federal or
state retrenchment. Perhaps the Supreme Court will come to embrace the
thrust of the 2004 Seventh Circuit decision written by Judge Richard
Posner wherein he suggested that the Fair Housing Act is not intended to
prohibit post-acquisition harassment in the fair housing context.57 Presto—
the City Human Rights Law would, on a McGrath analysis, no longer

56. Cf. Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 422 (1978). In that case,
which limited the circumstances under which a losing plaintiff would be vulnerable to
paying attorney’s fee to a defendant, the Supreme Court cautioned district courts “to resist
the understandable temptation to engage in post hoc reasoning by concluding that, because a
plaintiff did not ultimately prevail, his action must have been unreasonable or without
foundation. This kind of hindsight logic could discourage all but the most airtight claims, for
seldom can a prospective plaintiff be sure of ultimate success.” Id. at 421-22. In other
words, if plaintiffs who had a good faith belief that their rights had been violated faced the
risk that not prevailing would expose them to paying the defendant’s attorney’s fees, the
resulting chilling effect “would undercut the efforts of Congress to promote the vigorous
enforcement of the provisions of Title VII.” Id.
57. Halprin v. Prairie Single Family Homes, 388 F.3d 327, 329 (7th Cir. 2004) (“The
Fair Housing Act contains no hint either in its language or its legislative history of a concern
with anything but access to housing.”). Halprin is not alone. See, e.g., Cox v. City of
Dallas, 430 F.3d 734, 741 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing the quoted Halprin language with
approval, and rejecting a claim based on impaired “habitability,” but not ruling out claims of
constructive eviction); see also discussion infra notes 268–273 and accompanying text.

GURIAN_CHRISTENSEN

2006]

2/3/2011 10:12 PM

EYES ON THE PRIZE

115

proscribe such conduct either. 58 The City Council should not be forced to
leap into action to protect the City’s law every time some other law is cut
back. 59
3. Rote parallelism blinded judges to those areas
where the City law is textually distinct
The easy habit of “dropping the footnote” has led judges to misconstrue
provisions of the City Human Rights Law on a regular basis, committing
either the sin of failing to bother to read the statute, or the sin of failing to
believe what they have read.
In Forrest, for example, the Court of Appeals, asserting that the
provisions of the City Human Rights Law “mirrored” those of the State
Human Rights Law, 60 stated in dicta that, even if the quantum of
harassment had been sufficient to be actionable, the defendant would not be
liable for its supervisor’s harassment under the State Human Rights Law
because an “employer cannot be held liable [under state law] for an
employee’s discriminatory act unless the employer became a party to it by
encouraging, condoning, or approving it.” 61 The court was apparently
contemplating the City Human Rights Law as well, because the footnote to
its vicarious liability discussion referenced the availability of the federal
Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense under both City and State Human
Rights Law in “hostile work environment” cases. 62
The court correctly set forth the law insofar as it referred to the State
Human Rights Law. 63 It ignored, however, the explicit statutory text of
58. The protection provided by the Restoration Act against this particular result is
discussed infra at notes 268–273 and accompanying text.
59. The existing practice of rote parallelism has also meant that other doctrines clearly
inconsistent with a liberal construction requirement have become known as “well
established” despite the absence of liberal construction analysis, and have thus been
effectively shielded from challenge on a local level. For example, very real victims of very
real harassment are regularly deprived of the opportunity to have their cases go to a jury
because of the requirement—imposed as a matter of federal caselaw—that the victim
demonstrate that the harassment is “severe or pervasive.” Less burdensome requirements,
more consistent with the City Human Rights Law’s twin focus on victim’s rights and
maximum deterrence, could easily be developed—see infra notes 190–213 and
accompanying text—but my research has found no case where a federal or state judge has
thus far treated the question of the appropriate standard under City law as anything other
than a closed question, already determined by the contours of federal law.
60. Forrest v. Jewish Guild for the Blind, 819 N.E.2d 998, 1007 n.3 (N.Y. 2004).
61. Id. at 311.
62. Id. at 312 n.10. The federal affirmative defense was established in Faragher v. City
of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998) and Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742
(1998).
63. The Court did not deal explicitly with two circumstances where the employer would
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section 8-107(13)(b) of the City Human Rights Law, which provides for
three separate and independent circumstances under which an employer
shall be liable for the conduct of “an employee or agent” that is in violation
of the relevant employment discrimination provision of the statute.64 One
of these is where “the employee or agent exercised managerial or
Section 8-107(13)(b)(1) imposes no
supervisory responsibility.” 65
requirement that the employer encourage, condone, or acquiesce in the
conduct. 66 In fact, Totem Taxi, one of the cases cited by Forrest for the
contrary proposition, 67 was a motivating factor for creating a distinct
vicarious liability regime as part of the 1991 Amendments.68
It is true that there is a provision of the employer liability section that
sets forth an affirmative defense which involves pleading and proving the
establishment of, and compliance with, “policies, programs and procedures
for the prevention and detection of unlawful discriminatory practices.”69
This affirmative defense, however, does not apply to the question of
liability for the conduct of employees and agents who exercise managerial
or supervisory responsibility. It is only relevant to a liability determination
in the context of co-employee harassment where the question is whether the
employer should have known of the discriminatory conduct and failed to
exercise reasonable diligence to prevent such conduct. 70 In other words,
be automatically liable: (1) where the employee is a proxy of the employer; or (2) where the
acts involved are “quintessentially” those of an employer. See, e.g., Faragher, 524 U.S. at
789-90 (person sufficiently high in managerial hierarchy may have his acts imputed to
employer; a discriminatory discharge or failure to promote is the act of the employer).
Neither of these circumstances was present in Forrest, so the Court of Appeals had no
reason to address them.
64. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-107(13)(b). The relevant substantive provision is section
8-107(1)(a). Note that employers in the housing, public accommodations, and retaliation
contexts are strictly liable for the conduct of their employees and agents in all
circumstances. Id. § 8-107(13)(a).
65. Id. § 8-107(13)(b)(1).
66. A memorandum summarizing major provisions of the 1991 Amendments stated that,
in respect to: “[l]iability of employers for acts of employees and agents,” the 1991
Amendments provide for “[s]trict liability in housing and public accommodations” and
provide for “[s]trict liability in employment context for acts of managers and supervisors.”
1991 LEG. ANN., supra note 3, at 187. The Council designed the vicarious liability section
to, inter alia, “hold employers to a high level of liability for employment discrimination.”
1991 COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 28, at 6.
67. Forrest, 3 N.Y.3d at 311 (citing In re Totem Taxi, Inc. v. N.Y. State Human Rights
Appeal Bd., 480 N.E.2d 1075 (N.Y. 1985)).
68. “Even on the state level, narrow interpretations of civil rights laws have retarded
progress. For example, the State Court of Appeals has made it virtually impossible to hold
taxi companies responsible for the discriminatory acts committed by their drivers.” Mayor
David N. Dinkins, Remarks, supra note 4, at 1.
69. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-107(13)(d).
70. Section 8-107(13)(e) specifies that section 8-107(13)(b)(3)—the “should have
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the City Council made a different choice in 1991 about liability of
supervisors and managers than did the Supreme Court in 1998, 71 but the
blinders of rote parallelism prevented the Forrest court from seeing this.
Another egregious example of the “failure to read” problem is a state
case posing the question of whether “Work Experience Program”
participants were protected against sexual harassment.72 The judge,
believing that participants could not be classified as employees, and
asserting that the State and City Human Rights Laws “are limited in
applicability to the employment relationship,” dismissed the complaint.73
In fact, even if the Work Experience Program participants were not
employees, they may well have been covered under the “provider of public
accommodations” section and the “training program” sections of the law.74
Priore v. New York Yankees 75 presented a twist on the problem
illustrated by the foregoing cases. In Priore, the First Department may
have read the statute, but apparently did not want to believe what it said.
Before the 1991 Amendments, individuals were liable for their own
discriminatory acts in the housing and public accommodations contexts,
but were not generally liable in the employment context.76 The 1991

known” about co-employee harassment section—is the only liability determination able to
be affected by the establishment of the affirmative defense. It then goes on to provide that
the establishment of the affirmative defense shall be considered as a factor in mitigating the
amount of punitive damages or civil penalties to be imposed.
71. This was the year that Faragher and Ellerth were decided. By making the
affirmative defense only go to mitigation, not elimination, of punitives, it also made a
different decision from what the Supreme Court made in Kolstad v. American Dental
Association, 527 U.S. 526 (1999). See infra notes 292–302 and accompanying text.
72. McGhee v. City of New York, No. 113614/01, 2002 WL 1969260 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
2002).
73. Id. at *3. Cf. United States v. City of N.Y., 359 F.3d 83, 91-97 (2d Cir. 2004)
(holding that New York City work experience program participants are employees within
the meaning of Title VII).
74. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE §§ 8-102(9), 8-107(2)(c), 8-107(4).
75. Priore v. N.Y. Yankees, 761 N.Y.S.2d 608 (App. Div. 2003).
76. Compare the pre-1991 Amendments versions of sections 8-107(5)(a) and 8-107(2)
of the New York City Human Rights Law (proscribing conduct by persons in the housing
and public accommodations realms, respectively) with the pre-1991 Amendments version of
section 8-107(1)(a) (only proscribing conduct by “employers” in the workplace realm). The
term “persons,” pre-1991 Amendments, had been defined pursuant to section 8-102(1) to
include “individuals” (the 1991 Amendments, inter alia, replaced “individuals” with
“natural persons”). The provisions cited are contained in 1991 LEG. ANN., supra note 3, at
155-56, 153-54, and 152 respectively. The impact of the change is evidenced by the
outcome of In the Matter of the Complaints of Abdalkwy v. Douglas Elliman-Gibbons &
Ives, Nos. EM00106-4/19/88, EM00104-4/19/88, EM00105-4/19/88, 1991 WL 1288827,
*18 (N.Y.C. Com. Hum. Rts., June 28, 1991) (decision and order). In this employment case,
which arose prior to the 1991 Amendments, the individual discriminator was found not
liable because he had neither a financial interest in the employer entity nor the power to do
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Amendments took each of the various employment discrimination
provisions, all of which had proscribed workplace conduct by “employers,”
and expanded each of those provisions to proscribe workplace conduct by
the entity “or an employee or agent thereof.”77 This was one change that
several decisions on both the state and federal level did not seem to have
trouble appreciating. 78 Notwithstanding this, the Priore court held that
“There is no indication in the local ordinance, explicit or implicit, that it
was intended to afford a separate right of action against any and all fellow
employees based on their independent and unsanctioned contribution to a
hostile environment.” 79
The Priore court chose not to pay heed to the relevant portion of thenMayor Dinkins’ statement in signing the 1991 Amendments:
I myself was surprised to learn that under current local law, an employee
who has been the victim of sexual or racial harassment at the hands of a
co-worker can sue her employer but cannot sue the co-worker himself.
Without the possibility of legal action, co-worker harassment has
continued to poison many of our workplaces. The new law takes the
fundamental step of making all people legally responsible for their own
discriminatory conduct. 80

The Priore court compounded its error by failing to consider the
Committee Report accompanying the 1991 Amendments. The report had
stated that the pre-Amendments employment discrimination provisions of
City law were “silent as to the individual liability of their employees and
agents for such practices,” 81 but the 1991 Amendments, “would make
more than carry out decisions made by others. The Administrative Law Judge in her
February 25, 1991 Recommended Decision and Order had noted that “[o]nly amendment of
the Code by legislation can remedy this problem.” Id. at 25 n.4.
77. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE §§ 8-107(1)(a), (1)(b), (1)(c), (1)(d), (2), (3).
78. See, e.g., Murphy v. ERA United Realty, 674 N.Y.S.2d 415, 417 (App. Div. 1998)
(Section 8-107(1)(a) of the New York City Human Rights Law “expressly provides that it is
unlawful for ‘an employer or an employee or agent thereof’ to engage in discriminatory
employment practices. Accordingly, the plaintiff has a cause of action under this provision
against the employer as well as her coemployees.”); Lee v. Overseas Shipholding Group,
No. 00 CIV. 9682(DLC), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15355, at *21 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2002)
(individual liability under City law “regardless of ownership or decision-making power”);
Kojak v. Jenkins, No. 98 Civ. 4412(RPP), 1999 WL 244098, at *7 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26,
1999) (employment discrimination sections of City law “clearly provide for individual,
personal liability”); Harrison v. Indosuez, 6 F. Supp. 2d 224, 233-34 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (“As
the [City law] specifically allows for employee liability, there is no question that the law is
applicable against [the defendant] in his individual capacity.”); Alvarez v. J.C. Penney Co.,
No. 96 Cv. 5165, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21695, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 1997) (“the plain
language of the Code provides for liability against individual employees”).
79. Priore, 761 N.Y.S.2d at 614.
80. Mayor David N. Dinkins, Remarks, supra note 4, at 3-4 (emphasis added).
81. COMM. ON GEN. WELFARE, REPORT ON PROP. INT. NO. 465-A AND PROP. INT. NO.
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explicit such individual liability.” 82
How, then, did the court in Priore try to justify its conclusion that there
was no individual liability? The court literally had to invent a legislative
history. It asserted that, when the City extended liability to “an employer
or an employee or agent thereof,” it did so merely “in substitution for the
State statute’s ‘employer or licensing agency’.” 83 In fact, however, section
8-107(1)(a) of the City Human Rights Law did not deal with licensing
agencies before the 1991 Amendments, and it did not deal with licensing
agencies after the 1991 Amendments. 84 There had been a separate
provision of the City Human Rights Law that had dealt both with age
The
discrimination by employers and with licensing agencies. 85
proscription against age discrimination by employers was moved into
section 8-107(1)(a); the proscription against age discrimination by licensing
agencies was moved into an entirely different section, to join other
proscriptions on certain conduct by licensing agencies. 86 Accordingly, the
revision to section 8-107(1)(a) did not represent a substitution of language
from the State Human Rights Law, it represented an addition of language
not found in the State Human Rights Law. 87
To go along with its tale of how the language of the law changed, the
Priore court provided a theory of Council intent. It speculated that the
Council had only wanted to permit individual liability where the individual
had been acting with or on behalf of the employer in some agency or
536-A: SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS 9–10 (1991) [hereinafter 1991 COMMITTEE REPORT
ANALYSIS] (on file with Committee of General Welfare), available at
www.antibiaslaw.com/LL39CommitteeReport.pdf.
82. Id.; see also 1991 LEG. ANN., supra note 3, at 187 (documenting contemporaneous
memoranda summarizing the impact of the impact of the 1991 Amendments). The law went
from having a standard under which an employee was only liable where he or she “had the
power to do more than carry out decisions made by others” to a regime where “employees
and agents are responsible for their own discriminatory acts.” Id.
83. Priore, 761 N.Y.S.2d at 614.
84. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-107(1)(a) (examining both the pre-1991 Amendments
version and the version in place after the 1991 Amendments). 1991 LEG. ANN., supra note
3, at 154.
85. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-107(3-a) (in effect prior to the 1991 Amendments, but
deleted by those amendments); 1991 LEG. ANN., supra note 3, at 155.
86. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE §§ 8-107(1)(a), 8-107(9); 1991 LEG. ANN., supra note 3, at
156, 160.
87. In other words, a proscription on conduct by “employers and employees and agents
thereof” was, not surprisingly, intended to have broader effect than a proscription on
conduct by “employers” alone. Further proof of the baselessness of the Court’s
interpretation is found in the fact that the phrase “or employees or agents thereof” was
added to each and all of the operative employment discrimination proscriptions, N.Y.C.
ADMIN. CODE §§ 8-107(1) AND (2), even one where the phrase modified only the term “labor
organization.” Id. § 8-107(1)(c); 1991 LEG. ANN., supra note 3, at 152.
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supervisory capacity. 88 The problem is, if that were the Council’s purpose,
it need not have acted at all: section 8-107(6) of the City Human Rights
Law already was broader, providing that it “shall be an unlawful
discriminatory act for any person to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the
doing of any of the acts forbidden under this chapter, or to attempt to do
so.” 89
The Priore court was surely aware of the basic rule of statutory
construction that, “in the interpretation of a statute, the court must assume
that the Legislature did not deliberately place in the statute a phrase
intended to serve no purpose, but must read each word and give to it a
distinct and consistent meaning. . . “ 90 Unfortunately, this knowledge was
overborne by the court’s belief that the Council should not have wanted to
do what it had done. The only “substitution” involved in the case was the
court’s insertion of itself as a replacement for the legislative branch of local
government.
C. The Rejection of the Rote Parallelism Model:
Different Premises; Different Procedure
The Restoration Act renders the rote parallelism model obsolete, and
deprives cases decided via that model (and without consideration of liberal
construction principles) of any precedential value.
The Restoration Act requires that provisions of the City’s Human Rights
Law hereafter be construed liberally to accomplish the “uniquely broad and
remedial” purposes of the local law, “regardless of whether federal or New
York State civil and human rights laws, including those laws with
provisions comparably-worded to provisions of this title, have been so
construed.” 91 There is much packed into these new phrases; the revised
construction section comprises the single most important sentence of the
Restoration Act.92

88. Priore, 761 N.Y.S.2d at 614.
89. See 1991 LEG. ANN., supra note 3, at 160.
90. N.Y. STAT. LAW § 98 (McKinney 2005).
91. Restoration Act, supra note 7, at 13, amending N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-130.
92. One seemingly minor change—from requiring liberal construction of the “chapter”
containing the substantive provisions of the City’s Human Rights Law to requiring liberal
construction of the entire City Human Rights Law “title”—was necessitated by the
argument actually advanced by the City Law Department in another Court of Appeals case
that liberal construction did not apply at all because the case had been commenced in court
pursuant to Chapter 5 of the City Human Rights Law, and that Chapter did not itself have a
liberal construction provision. See Defendant’s Brief at 2004 WL 1091832, *25-26, Krohn v.
N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 811 N.E.2d 8 (N.Y. 2004) (No. 03508) (“. . . section 8-130 limits
application of the ‘liberal construction’ provision to chapter one of the [New York City
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A fundamental premise of McGrath—and of the entire rote parallelism
school—was that the purposes of the City Human Rights Law are
“identical” to those of its state and federal counterparts. 93 That premise is
unequivocally rejected: post-Restoration Act local law now provides that
its purposes are “uniquely broad and remedial.” This alone makes the
application of rote parallelism logically indefensible, and it requires judges
to recognize two things. First, since the local law’s purposes are even more
broad and remedial than those of state and federal civil rights laws,
interpretations of those other laws naturally constitute a floor of rights
below which interpretations of City Human Rights Law should not fall. 94
Second, a judge must search out what the broader and more remedial
purposes of the City Human Rights Law actually are in order for that judge
to assess what potential interpretation of a particular provision would serve
the law’s overall purposes best. 95
The fundamental procedure of McGrath—and of the entire rote
parallelism school—was, by definition, to import interpretations of federal
or state civil rights laws automatically. That procedure is unequivocally
condemned: the process of liberal construction to accomplish the uniquely
broad and remedial purposes of the local law must be allowed to proceed
“regardless of whether federal or New York State civil and human rights
laws . . . have been so construed.” 96 The demand for broad and
independent construction came, inter alia, from the Center’s testimony,97
from the Brennan Center Statement, 98 and from the Bar Association
Letter, 99 and is reflected, inter alia, in Council Member Palma’s

Human Rights Law], entitled ‘Commission on Human Rights.’ Nothing in the New York
City Human Rights Law instructs courts to apply a rule of liberal construction to section 8502(a), the provision creating a private right of action for ‘damages, including punitive
damages,’ which appears in chapter five.”).
93. McGrath v. Toys “R” Us, Inc., 821 N.E.2d 519, 525 (N.Y. 2004).
94. See, e.g., 2005 COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 22, at 5 (“provisions of the human
rights law may not be construed less liberally than interpretations of comparably worded
federal and state laws”).
95. See discussion infra notes 121–165 and accompanying text regarding how to do so.
96. Restoration Act, supra note 7, § 7 amending N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-130.
97. “In the end, regardless of federal interpretations, the primary task of a judge hearing
a City Human Rights Law claim is to find the interpretation for the City law that most
robustly further[s] the purposes of the City statute.” Center Testimony, supra note 23, at 6
(emphasis added).
98. The bill would “require judges to interpret the local law independently of any
limitations that may have been imposed on its federal and state counterparts.” Brennan
Center Statement, supra note 23, at 1 (emphasis added).
99. “Intro 22-A requires courts to construe the City’s Human Rights Law independently
and in light of the Council’s clear intent to provide the greatest possible protection for civil
rights.” Bar Association Letter, supra note 23, at 4 (emphasis added).
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statement, 100 in the 2005 Committee Report,101 and in Section 1 of the
Restoration Act itself.102
Because judges have often thought that the existence of similarly or
identically-worded counterparts is reason enough to ignore the requirement
of liberal construction, the Restoration Act is careful to state explicitly that
the need to proceed independently to find the result that best fits the
purposes of the City Human Rights Law must go forward even where the
differently-construed federal and state counterparts have provisions
“comparably-worded to provisions of this title.” 103 In the same way that
Justice Brennan’s 1977 call for independent analysis in the protection of
rights beyond the level protected federally did not exempt state guarantees
that linguistically tracked the federal provision, 104 so the Restoration Act
insists on such independent analysis in all circumstances.
What then to do with existing caselaw? The philosophy of the
Restoration Act is simply inconsistent with a court hereafter according
weight to prior federal or state decisions merely because those decisions
spoke to an aspect of City Human Rights Law (or of comparably-worded
state or federal law). Each of the statements specifically brought to the full
Council’s attention make the point. “[M]any federal decisions,” according
to Center testimony, “are not helpful to the interpretative process because
those decisions themselves give no consideration to principles of liberal

100. “Insisting that our local law be interpreted broadly and independently will safeguard
New Yorkers at a time when federal and state civil rights protections are in jeopardy.”
Annabel Palma, Meeting of the New York City Council 41 (Sept. 15, 2005) (transcript on
file with the New York City Clerk’s Office) (emphasis added).
101. The bill “explicitly states that the human rights law must be construed independently
from both federal and New York State civil and human rights law, including laws with
comparably worded provisions.” 2005 COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 22, at 4-5 (emphasis
added). The 2005 COMMITTEE REPORT also incorporates the view expressed by Mayor
Dinkins in connection with the passage of the 1991 Amendments: “[I]t is the intention of the
Council that judges interpreting the City’s Human Rights Law are not [to be] bound by
restrictive state and federal rulings and are to take seriously the requirement that this law be
liberally and independently construed.” Id. at 2 (emphasis added; internal citation omitted).
102. “In particular, through passage of this local law, the Council seeks to underscore that
the provisions of New York City’s Human Rights Law are to be construed independently
from similar or identical provisions of New York state or federal statutes.” Restoration Act,
supra note 7, § 1 (emphasis added).
103. Restoration Act, supra note 7, § 7, amending N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-130.
104. Brennan, Protecting Individual Rights, supra note 54, at 500-01 (citing with
approval the many examples then existing “where state courts have independently
considered the merits of constitutional arguments and declined to follow opinions of the
United States Supreme Court they find unconvincing, even where the state and federal
constitutions are similarly or identically phrased”) (emphasis added). This point was
quoted in the Brennan Center Statement, supra note 23, at 8.
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construction.” 105 The Bar Association Letter similarly pointed out that,
“[j]udges interpreting federal law may not necessarily use this principle of
liberal construction.” 106 It bears mention here that another premise of
McGrath is thus undercut: the fact that a federal or state law has broad
purposes does not allow the assumption that a decision construing such a
law has actually considered those purposes.
In view of the concerns about the pitfalls of importing decisions that
have interpreted counterpart civil rights statutes, the Restoration Act only
allows an interpretation of a state or federal civil rights law to be used as an
“aid in interpretation” of the City Human Rights Law in two ways. One
permissible use is insofar as the interpretation of a similarly-worded state
or federal law is viewed “as a floor below which the City’s Human Rights
law cannot fall, rather than a ceiling above which the local law cannot
rise.” 107 This provision follows both from the traditional notion of federal
civil rights protections as a floor,108 and as a consequence of the
Restoration Act’s aim “to ensure construction of the City’s Human Rights
Law in line with the purposes of fundamental amendments to the law
enacted in 1991.” 109 The 1991 Amendments, as previously discussed, had
already seen state and federal law as too constrained, and sought to build
beyond those constraints. 110 As such, the Council knew that while it
wanted judges to spend significant time considering the outer limits of how
far the law needed to go to best accomplish its purposes, judges could, in
general, safely rely on the fact that the Council would not want the local
law to be any less protective than the most protective posture of federal or
state law as they existed in 1991 or at any time thereafter.111 In contrast,
the interpretation of the counterpart law is emphatically not to be used “to
limit or restrict the provisions of this title from being construed more
105. Center Testimony, supra note 23, at 6.
106. Bar Association Letter, supra note 23, at 2; see also Brennan Center Statement,
supra note 23, at 8 (pointing out that “the current habit of automatically relying on
interpretations of state or federal law is exactly the opposite of the practice recommended by
Justice Brennan”).
107. Restoration Act, supra note 7, § 1.
108. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-7, 2000a-6(b), 3615, 12201(b) (2005).
109. See 2005 COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 22, at 2.
110. See supra notes 28–32 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 127-43 and
accompanying text.
111. Because it is theoretically possible (albeit currently wildly unlikely) for a decision
construing federal law to go further in the protection of federal rights than would be justified
to fulfill the purposes of the City Human Rights Law, the use of the federal law decision as
an aid in interpretation is permissive. See Restoration Act, supra note 8, § 1; cf. Restoration
Act, supra note 7, § 7 (amending N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-130) (using the mandatory
“shall” in describing the obligation to construe the local law to accomplish its uniquely
broad and remedial purposes).
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liberally than [the counterpart] laws in order to accomplish the purposes of
the human rights law . . . .” 112
The second permissible use must be inferred from the purpose of the
construction provision, and from the analysis that underlies the Restoration
Act. As underlined in section 8-130 of the revised New York City Human
Rights Law, the point of the entire exercise is to find the construction that
best accomplishes law’s purposes. 113 As such, it is the persuasive value of
an opinion that has cogently grappled with how best to achieve the
purposes of a counterpart civil rights statute that makes it potentially useful
to the analysis of the local law, 114 not the mere fact that the decision
announced a result. As Justice Brennan wrote in urging judicial vigilance
in the defense of civil rights, it is only where decisions construing rights
guaranteed federally have looked at the relevant policies underlying the
grant of rights and have considered, in a well-reasoned and logically
persuasive way, whether the proposed constructions serve those underlying
policies, that such decisions may “properly claim persuasive weight as
guideposts” when interpreting counterparts to the federal guarantees. 115
These two uses are the only ways that existing caselaw may be validly
used as precedent. To restate Justice Brennan’s proposition: those
decisions that have not looked at the relevant policies, and those decisions
which have failed to conduct well-reasoned and logically persuasive
analyses, may not properly claim persuasive weight as guidelines in
connection with the construction of the City’s Human Rights Law. 116
It should not be necessary to belabor further the fact that the Restoration
Act stands as a rejection for McGrath and its ilk. The 2005 Committee

112. 2005 COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 22, at 5.
113. See Bar Association Letter, supra note 23, at 2 (the bill “makes it clear that judges
must consider the legislative intent underlying provisions of the Human Rights Law, and ask
which interpretation of the law will best fulfill the objectives of the law, rather than
adopting, as a matter of course, the prevailing interpretation of similar provisions of federal
or state law”) (emphasis added).
114. See Center Testimony, supra note 23, at 5-6 (the reasoning of state and federal
opinions construing counterpart statutes “like the reasoning contained in law review articles
and other sources . . . can suggest potential interpretations, and, in some situations, will be
found to be persuasive by the judge hearing the City Human Rights Law claim”) (emphasis
in original).
115. Brennan, Protecting Individual Rights, supra note 54, at 502.
116. One non-precedential use should be added. While the fact that a particular result
(“Interpretation A”) arises from a decision that has failed this test means that the decision
has no precedential value, that fact does not mean that a judge may not consider
Interpretation A along with plaintiff’s proposed result (“Interpretation B”), defendant’s
proposed result (“Interpretation C”) (likely Interpretation A in disguise), and the judge’s
own tentative result (“Interpretation D”). The judge would not adopt Interpretation A,
however, unless it was the interpretation that best fulfilled the purposes of the local law.
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Report specifically states that the amendment to section 8-130 of the New
York City Human Rights Law is designed to overcome McGrath.117 But it
is important to note one final aspect of McGrath—its Council-should-justfix-specific-provisions theory—and explain why the Restoration Act
intended that this kind of theory should not again rear its ugly head. First,
unlike in 1991, the Council did with the Restoration Act modify a specific
provision—section 8-130—to reflect its desired mode of construction.
Second, the design of the Restoration Act completely rebuts McGrath’s
premise that Council inaction in respect to an unduly narrow judicial
interpretation of a particular substantive provision of the City Human
Rights Law can fairly be interpreted as implicit ratification of that judicial
error.
The Council could have limited itself to the particular substantive and
procedural fixes discussed in Part II of this article. It chose not to do so. It
saw that the law had been construed too narrowly, that the process of
narrowing was ongoing, and that even the use of statutory distinct language
had not been sufficient to protect the law. It thus developed a solution that
was designed to accommodate more than the specific fixes set out in other
sections of the Restoration Act, and more than the numerous other
problematic areas of law that had been brought to the Council’s attention.
In short, it developed a process of reflection and reconsideration (the
requirement of independent construction) that is intended to serve as a
continuing shield and sword for the City Human Rights Law in all its
dimensions. 118
Nothing in the language of section 8-130 of the New York City Human
Rights Law limits the requirement of broad and independent construction
to particular provisions; when the 2005 Committee Report refers to the
need to defend the “protections” of the City Human Rights Law against
“restrictive interpretations,” it uses the term “protections” without

117. 2005 COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 22, at 4-5. Indeed, the version of Intro 22 that
was ultimately enacted had stronger language than the original, pre-McGrath version. The
original version is found at NEW YORK CITY COUNCIL PROCEEDINGS 2004 338-40 (Feb. 4,
2004). The characterization of the local law’s purposes as “uniquely broad and remedial”
was added later, as was the unequivocal statement that local law construction needed to
proceed “regardless” of how federal or state law had been construed. 2005 COMMITTEE
REPORT, supra note 22, at 4-5. The Restoration Act’s first version had no initial “purpose”
section; only the final version had an initial “purpose” section that underlined both the need
for independent construction and the idea of comparable civil rights laws as a floor below
which the City law cannot fall, not a ceiling above which it may not rise. Id. at 5.
118. Cf. N.Y. STAT. LAW § 95 cmt. (“A statute framed in language of general import, not
only may be deemed applicable to temporary existing evils, but may be construed to meet
those which subsequently arise.”).

GURIAN_CHRISTENSEN

126

2/3/2011 10:12 PM

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XXXIII

limitation. 119 As advocates made clear to the City Council, the revised
construction provision should obviate the need to fix specific substantive
provisions over and over again. “Amendments such as these,” wrote the
Association of the Bar, “should no longer be necessary after Intro 22-A is
enacted because Intro 22-A requires courts to construe the City’s Human
Rights Law independently and in light of the Council’s clear intent to
provide the greatest possible protection for civil rights.” 120
D. Providing Guidance
There is nothing mysterious about what judges need to do to fulfill the
legislative intent of the Restoration Act. Step one is to revive the tradition
of liberal construction that used to prevail routinely. Step two is to adapt
that tradition to a statute whose structure, language, and intent all point to a
body of law far less concerned with preserving the prerogatives of covered
entities, and far more concerned with preventing and punishing
discrimination in all its manifestations (and with compensating victims of
such acts), than are the counterpart federal and state statutes. Step three is
to heed the specific guidance generated in connection with the passage of
the Restoration Act.
1. Reviving the tradition
When New York’s Court of Appeals was faced thirty one years ago with
a city seeking to disclaim responsibility for sex discrimination on the
grounds that any discrimination acts were attributable only to an
independent entity, the court would not hear of it:
Since the statute is to be “construed liberally for the accomplishment of
the purposes thereof” (Executive Law, § 300), the City of Schenectady
should not be permitted to avoid responsibility for discriminatory acts of
persons appointed by it and under a procedure which it itself established,
pursuant to the labor relations agreement. Sexual discrimination in
employment being deplorable, it is the duty of courts to make sure that the
Human Rights Law works and that the intent of the Legislature is not
thwarted by a combination of strict construction of the statute and a battle

119. 2005 COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 22, at 2.
120. Bar Association Letter, supra note 23, at 4. See also Brennan Center Statement,
supra note 24, at 7 (“Rather than being reactive—waiting, for example, until after the
Supreme Court cuts back on standing for testers and fair housing organizations, and then
waiting further, for the years it frequently takes to achieve a specific legislative
restoration—Intro 22 will provide a means of preventing such dismantling of New York
City’s civil rights protections in the first place.”).
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with semantics. 121

Even the United States Supreme Court has—not so long ago—
recognized the importance of looking to the purposes of a statute in
determining how to construe it. 122 It had to decide whether after-acquired
evidence of serious wrongdoing (that is, that which would have resulted in
dismissal) should operate in all cases to bar all relief for an earlier violation
of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). 123 Before it could
reach a conclusion, it needed to look at the purposes of the statutory
scheme:
The ADEA and Title VII share common substantive features and also a
common purpose: “the elimination of discrimination in the
workplace.” . . . Congress designed the remedial measures in these
statutes to serve as a “spur or catalyst” to cause employers “to selfexamine and to self-evaluate their employment practices and to endeavor
to eliminate, so far as possible, the last vestiges” of discrimination. . . .
Deterrence is one object of these statutes. Compensation for injuries
caused by the prohibited discrimination is another. 124

Having identified compensation and deterrence as goals of the statute,
the Court turned to the mechanism used by the statutes to effectuate the
goals:
The ADEA, in keeping with these purposes, contains a vital element
found in both Title VII and the Fair Labor Standards Act: It grants an
injured employee a right of action to obtain the authorized relief. 29
U.S.C. § 626(c). The private litigant who seeks redress for his or her
injuries vindicates both the deterrence and the compensation objectives of
the ADEA. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 45, 94 S.
Ct. 1011, 1018, 39 L.Ed.2d 147 (1974) (“[T]he private litigant [in Title
VII] not only redresses his own injury but also vindicates the important
congressional policy against discriminatory employment practices”); see
also Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 364, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 1869,
52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977). 125

The Court concluded that a comprehensive ban on all relief in all cases
would be contrary to the effective administration of the ADEA:
The objectives of the ADEA are furthered when even a single employee
establishes that an employer has discriminated against him or her. The

121. City of Schenectady v. State Div. on Human Rights, 335 N.E.2d 290, 295 (N.Y.
1975) (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted).
122. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Pub. Co., 513 U.S. 352, 358 (1995).
123. Id. at 360.
124. Id. at 358 (internal citations omitted).
125. Id.
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disclosure through litigation of incidents or practices that violate national
policies respecting nondiscrimination in the work force is itself important,
for the occurrence of violations may disclose patterns of noncompliance
resulting from a misappreciation of the Act’s operation or entrenched
resistance to its commands, either of which can be of industry-wide
significance. The efficacy of its enforcement mechanisms becomes one
measure of the success of the Act. 126

One might disagree with the Court’s ultimate conclusion127 but, it is
clear to see, the exploration of statutory purposes is essential.
2. Adapting to the enhanced enforcement focus
of the City Human Rights Law
As has already been discussed, a court, seeking to construe a provision
of the City Human Rights Law, must take account of: (a) the Council’s
belief that the law has heretofore been construed too narrowly; (b) the fact
that the purposes of the City Human Rights Law are “uniquely broad and
remedial; and (c) the Council’s intention that the law be construed “in line
with the purposes of fundamental amendments to the law enacted in
1991.” 128
What the phrases “uniquely broad and remedial purposes” and
“fundamental amendments” reflect is the fact that, in 1991, the City Human
Rights Law shifted decisively away from the “let’s see if we can conciliate
and become friends” philosophy that animated the first generation of
modern civil rights statutes. The City Human Rights Law became instead a
statute that had at its core traditional law enforcement values. These
included the belief that deterrence was necessary to maximize compliance,
and that deterrence could only be achieved: (a) under a regime that
maximized responsibility for discriminatory acts and concurrently
minimized the leeway accorded covered entities to evade such
responsibility; and (b) where non-compliance was seen to have serious
consequences.
Built into the law was the belief that a system that truly has “zero
tolerance” for discrimination must punish violations severely, especially

126. Id. at 358-59.
127. Some would argue, for example, that the Court did not adequately address what it
acknowledged was the “not insubstantial” concern that “employers might as a routine matter
undertake extensive discovery into an employee’s background or performance on the job to
resist claims. . . . “ Id. at 363. The view that Rule 11 sanctions would help to “deter most
abuses” has proven to be unduly optimistic.
128. See Restoration Act, supra note 7, §§1, 7; 2005 COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 22,
at 2.
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because every act of discrimination is seen to represent an injury not only
to the individual victim, but to the City as a whole. Joined to this core
belief in civil rights enforcement as law enforcement, and, in some
respects, a function of it, was the view that the needs of victims of
discrimination are sufficiently important that they trump—in all but the
most limited circumstances—concerns about any burdens to be placed on
covered entities.
Given the scant attention paid by courts to the changes effected by the
1991 Amendments, 129 it may at first seem unlikely that the sea change
described above actually occurred. Could it be that the 1991 Amendments
merely distinguished its local law in a few requests from its state and
federal counterparts? If so, one might reasonably infer that the changes
actually meant that the City was fundamentally satisfied with (and had
implicitly adopted) the basic principles, assumptions, and concerns of state
and federal civil rights law.
In fact, any skepticism about the scope of the philosophical change
represented by those amendments is quickly and simply put to rest by
reading the 1991 Amendments. 130 They were numerous, substantive, and
dramatic. They included the creation of two new mechanisms for fighting
discrimination: one, a private right of action for aggrieved persons; and
two, vesting of the City’s Law Department with explicit statutory authority
to investigate and prosecute instances of systemic discrimination.
Recognizing that discrimination harmed the City itself, the 1991
Amendments imposed—for cases proven in the administrative context—
civil penalties designed to “vindicate the public interest.” 131
Rather than capping compensatory and punitive damages in the manner

129. A rare exception where the existence of the legislative history was noticed was
Burger v. Litton Industries, No. 91 Civ. 09181996 WL 421449, at *19 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 25,
1996), adopted, No. 91 Civ. 09181996 WL 609421 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 22, 1996)) (“the
‘legislative history’ of the [New York City Human Rights Law] makes clear that it is to be
even more liberally construed than the federal and state anti-discrimination laws”) (internal
citation omitted). Referencing the language in Burger, the Second Circuit, in a case
frequently cited for the proposition of parallelism, came tantalizingly close the following
year to grappling with the 1991 Amendments before providing that it “need not consider
those issues here, as [plaintiff] has not challenged the district court’s dismissal of her state
and city human rights claims on appeal.” Torres v. Pisano, 116 F.3d 625, 629 n.1 (2d Cir.
1997); see also 119-121 East 97th Street Corp. v. N.Y.C. Comm’n on Human Rights, 642
N.Y.S.2d 638, 644 (App. Div. 1996) (“The legislative history of the amendments to the
Administrative Code, including the civil penalty provision, indicates that they were intended
to strengthen and expand the enforcement mechanisms of the law so the Commission could
prevent discrimination from playing any role in actions related to employment, public
accommodations, housing and other real estate.”).
130. 1991 Amendments, supra note 3; 1991 LEG. ANN., supra note 3.
131. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-126(a); 1991 LEG. ANN., supra note 3, at 174.
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of Title VII out of concern for what uncapped awards might mean for
covered entities, the City defined the private right of action as one that
included uncapped compensatory and uncapped punitive damages.
Rather than excluding damages in disparate impact cases and in mixed
motive cases, as the Civil Rights Act of 1991 did in connection with Title
VII cases, the City Human Rights Law contains no such exclusion. The
1991 Amendments to the City law, however, did include as part of the
fundamental policy of the law the idea that discrimination must “play no
role.” 132
Disparate impact was explicitly covered in all contexts and in respect to
all protected classes, with burdens of proof requiring more of a defendant
than is the case pursuant to federal law.133
Under federal law, a covered entity which has failed to provide
reasonable accommodation as required by the Americans with Disabilities
Act is nevertheless sheltered from exposure to damages if it had made good
faith efforts to identify and make such accommodation.134 The 1991
Amendments contained no such exemption.
Under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Fair Housing Act,
only those impairments which substantially limit a major life function
allow a person to meet either statute’s definition of disability. 135 The 1991
Amendments, by contrast, have no such restriction.
Under the Fair Housing Act, a covered entity is only required to permit a
person to make reasonable modifications to a dwelling. 136 Under the 1991
Amendments, the covered entity is both obliged to make and pay for such
modifications, unless to do so would be an undue hardship. 137
The 1991 Amendments limited the then-existing exemption to the City
Law’s fair housing provisions. Until the 1991 Amendments, rental
apartments in owner-occupied two-family buildings were not covered by
the law’s anti-discrimination provisions. The 1991 Amendments severely
curtailed that exemption.138

132. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-101. This was echoed in Mayor David N. Dinkins’
remarks on June 18, 1991. See Mayor David N. Dinkins, Remarks, supra note 4, at 2.
133. For example, even when a defendant has shown that a practice “bears a significant
relationship to a significant business objective,” a plaintiff only has to produce “substantial
evidence” that “an alternative policy or practice with less disparate impact is available. The
defendant bears the burden of persuasion that the alternative policy or practice “would not
serve the covered entity as well.” N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-107(17)(a).
134. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(3) (2005).
135. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) and 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h)(1), respectively.
136. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(A).
137. See infra note 252 and accompanying text.
138. A comparison of the pre-1991 Amendments version of section 8-107(5)(a)(4)(a)(1)
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Not wanting to permit a covered entity to evade liability by claiming that
it was unaware of the needs of persons with disabilities, the 1991
Amendments triggered the obligation to make reasonable accommodation
to persons with disabilities as soon as the entity should have known of the
disability, a provision not available under the Americans with Disabilities
Act. 139
The minimum number of employees required for an employer to be
covered under the City law had been four (meaning that hundreds of
thousands of New York City workers not covered by Title VII were
covered by the local law). The 1991 Amendments broadened coverage still
further by requiring that natural persons not themselves employers who
were independent contractors for an employer would be counted as
employees for coverage purposes. 140
The 1991 Amendments adopted strict vicarious liability provisions,
provisions unknown under Title VII. In the co-employee workplace
harassment context, the City was not satisfied with imposing vicarious
liability on the employer where it failed to take “immediate and appropriate
corrective action” after one of its supervisors or managers learned of the
discriminatory conduct.141 Employers would also be vicariously liable
where they should have known about the conduct, but failed to exercise
reasonable diligence to prevent such conduct. 142 For the first time, the City
even identified circumstances under which employers would also be held
responsible for conduct of independent contractors.143
As Mayor Dinkins pointed out, a “fundamental step” of the 1991
amendments was making individuals responsible for their own
discriminatory conduct. 144
of the Administrative Code of the City of New York, with its post-1991 Amendments
counterpart, shows that the exemption is no longer available where the housing
accommodation is “publicly-assisted,” as broadly defined in section 8-102(11), or where it
has been publicly advertised, listed, or otherwise offered to the general public. See 1991
LEG. ANN., supra note 3, at 156.
139. Compare N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-107(15)(a) with 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A)
(2005).
140. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-102(5).
141. Id. § 8-107(13)(b)(2). It should be reemphasized that outside the contexts of section
8-107(1) (employment) and section 8-107(2) (apprentice training program) employers are
strictly liable for the conduct of all employees or agents, regardless of position, not just for
those employees or agents who exercise supervisory or managerial authority. Id. § 8107(13)(a).
142. Id.§ 8-107(13)(b)(3). The “duty of care” standard under federal law, looking to
whether appropriate preventative measures were taken, only applies in the context of
supervisory or managerial misconduct.
143. Id. § 8-107(13)(c).
144. Mayor David N. Dinkins, Remarks, supra note 4, at 4-5.

GURIAN_CHRISTENSEN

132

2/3/2011 10:12 PM

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XXXIII

Impatient with the litigation that had swirled around the definition of
what entities would be considered a “place of public accommodation,” the
1991 Amendments adopted sweeping language covering places or
providers of “goods, services, facilities, accommodations, advantage or
privileges of any kind.” 145 The message was this: a laundry list of covered
types of establishments was not enough to encompass the City’s
overarching goal of preventing discrimination whenever a covered entity
interacted with a member of the public. 146
The changes in administrative procedure also represented a major shift.
The City believed that discrimination cases had matured to a level well
beyond the simple and relatively informal process that may have sufficed in
the 1960s—a time when the routine brazenness of discrimination meant
that cases were factually simple, a time when a sophisticated discrimination
defense industry did not yet exist, and a time when the hope for voluntary
compliance was still strong.
The 1991 Amendments treated the
administrative process as now deserving of the seriousness of a full-blown
plenary proceeding, requiring timely answers, authorizing demands for
record production and retention, placing the “prosecutorial bureau” of the
Commission on Human Rights in the role of party to all administrative
complaints, contemplating full pre-trial discovery and the ability to compel
discovery, and providing that the Commission could impose civil penalties
for the violation of its orders (in addition to enforcing its orders through
court action). 147
* * *
The 1991 Amendments were consistent in tone and approach: every
change either expanded coverage, limited an exemption, increased
responsibility, or broadened remedies. In case after case, the balance
struck by the Amendments favored victims and the interests of enforcement
over the claimed needs of covered entities in ways materially different from
those incorporated into state and federal law. In view of this strong pattern,
interpretations of “open” areas of law are only fairly construed consistent
with the spirit that animated that pattern.

145. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-102(9).
146. This description of amendments is only a partial one. Among others: elimination of
a previously existing exemption for many educational institutions; the broadening of the
proscription against retaliation to proscribe retaliation “in any manner”; and a new
proscription against marital status discrimination in the employment context.
147. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE §§ 8-111, 8-114, 8-117, 8-118, 8-125; 1991 LEG. ANN., supra
note 3, at 168-71, 174.
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3. Acting in compliance with guidance
specifically related to the Restoration Act
The guidance on how to carry out liberal construction in the manner
intended by the Restoration Act is clear and consistent. The AntiDiscrimination Center’s testimony referenced the principles described in
the preceding section, including the need to maximize coverage and
counteract evasion. 148 The Brennan Center, identifying the “stronger law
enforcement focus provided by the local law,” explained that the task was
to construe the law bearing these purposes in mind. 149 The Bar Association
pointed to the City Council’s “clear intent to provide the greatest possible
protection for civil rights.” 150
The 2005 Committee Report echoes these concerns when discussing
how judges should approach issues of interpretation arising under the
construction provision of City Human Rights Law. The Report says that
decision makers should be guided by certain principles. The first principle
specified is that “discrimination should not play a role in decisions made by
employers, landlords, and providers of public accommodations”; the
second is that “traditional methods and principles of law enforcement ought
to be applied in the civil rights context”; and the third is that “victims of
discrimination suffer serious injuries for which they ought to receive full
compensation.” 151 The Report concludes with an explanation of the
importance of the civil penalties being enhanced by the Restoration Act, an
explanation encapsulating the Council’s “zero tolerance” policy: the
imposition of penalties, according to the Report, “sends a strong signal to
those who discriminate that such acts cause serious injury, to both the
persons directly involved and the social fabric of the city as a whole, which

148. See Center Testimony, supra note 23, at 5 (citing the need to: “(a) maximize the
coverage provided by the law; (b) make certain that discrimination plays no role in the
various decisions made each day in New York City by employers, landlords, and providers
of public accommodations; (c) strictly limit the zone in which discrimination may be
practiced; (d) maximize the deterrent effect of the law, with the recognition that traditional
methods and principles of law enforcement should be applicable in the civil rights context;
(e) minimize and counteract evasion of the law, including attempts to feign ignorance of the
requirements of the law, or otherwise to engage in diversionary legal tactics; (f) always
compensate victims of discrimination fully; (g) maximize access to the courts; and (h) treat
discrimination injuries as serious injuries both to the individual victim, and to New York
City.”).
149. Brennan Center Statement, supra note 23, at. 4.
150. Bar Association Letter, supra note 23, at 4.
151. 2005 COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 22, at 5. The Report also insists that there
must always be “thoughtful, independent consideration of whether the proposed
interpretation would fulfill the uniquely broad and remedial purposes of the City’s human
rights law.” Id. at 5, n.8.
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will not be tolerated.” 152
One cannot review the Council’s recitation that the City Human Rights
Law had been construed too narrowly, the Council’s characterization of the
law’s purposes as being “uniquely broad and remedial,” the Council’s goal
of vindicating the purposes of the 1991 Amendments, the relentless
broadening of those amendments, the testimony on which the Council
relied, and the other aspects of the Restoration Act’s legislative history,
without emerging with the clear sense that any doubts about the
interpretation of the law should be resolved in favor of giving the law the
broadest and most powerful reach that is possible. Consistent with this
approach, any exemptions to the law’s coverage must be construed
narrowly. 153 Application of these considerations to more than a dozen
illustrations of areas of the law is covered in Section F of this article. First
though, it is important to set out explicitly the Restoration Act’s respect
for—and consistency with—principles of judicial independence.
E. Maintaining Judicial Independence
The legislative history makes clear that the Restoration Act is not in any
way designed to place judges in a straightjacket, but rather, is designed to
combat the mischief of rote parallelism, and to remind, empower, and
require judges to fulfill their essential role as active and zealous agents for
the vindication of the purposes of the law. The expectations of and for the
Restoration Act were expressed consistently. The Bar Association pointed
out, for example, that the Act “does not preclude judges from adopting the
prevailing interpretation of federal law . . . so long as they conclude that the
federal interpretation best serves the broad remedial purposes of the Human
Rights Law.” 154 The key is taking the time to engage in the process of
asking “which interpretation of the law will best fulfill the objectives of the
law.” 155
The Brennan Center observed that “[i]t is a fundamental task of a court
to use its best judgment to determine [which interpretation] best fulfills the
purpose of the statute under examination. The provision of Intro 22 in
152. Id. at 6.
153. See City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 514 U.S. 526, 531-32 (1995) (“[W]e
are mindful of the [Fair Housing Act’s] stated policy ‘to provide, within constitutional
limitations, for fair housing within the United States. We also note precedent recognizing
the FHA’s ‘broad and inclusive’ compass, and therefore according a ‘generous construction’
to the Act’s complaint-filing provision. Accordingly, we regard this case as an instance in
which an exception to ‘a general statement of policy’ is sensibly read ‘narrowly in order to
preserve the primary operation of the [policy.]’”) (internal citations omitted).
154. Bar Association Letter, supra note 23, at, 2.
155. Id.
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question requires a court to do nothing more than engage in that process
with due regard for the underlying purposes of the law.” 156
The Anti-Discrimination Center’s testimony made this same point: “The
bill does not oblige a judge to accept a particular argument that an advocate
is advancing, but it does insist that judges thoughtfully consider whether
the interpretation being advanced, or a different one, would address the
purposes of the City Human Rights Law most robustly.” 157 In language
almost identical to that testimony, the 2005 Committee Report noted that,
“The bill does not require a decision maker to accept any particular
argument being advanced by an advocate, but underscores the need for
thoughtful, independent consideration of whether the proposed
interpretation would fulfill the uniquely broad and remedial purposes of the
City’s Human Rights Law.” 158
In an era where the phrase “judicial restraint” is frequently used more as
a term of approbation than one that has reliable meaning, it is important to
decode the ways in which the Restoration Act expects and does not expect
judges to exercise restraint. Restraint is expected both in resisting the urge
towards rote parallelism, and in respect to not substituting a judge’s own,
more conservative set of social policy decisions for the policy judgments
made by the Council. On the other hand, activism is expected in seeing that
the law as interpreted fulfills its extraordinarily broad intended reach. 159
When construing a statute that is effectively “new territory” because of
the absence of serious work to construe it heretofore; that announces that
“there is no greater danger to the health, morals, safety and welfare of the
city” than discrimination; 160 that describes discrimination as “menac[ing]
the institutions and foundation of a free democratic state”; 161 and that
insists that discrimination be proscribed “from playing any role in actions
relating to employment, public accommodations, and housing,” 162 it is well
to consider what a Supreme Court—very different in composition from
today’s Court—did in the early days after the enactment of the Fair
Housing Act. In surveying what was then also new territory, citing the fact
that the language of the Fair Housing Act was “broad and inclusive”163 and
was intended to vindicate “a policy that Congress considered to be of the

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Brennan Center Statement, supra note 23, at 9.
Center Testimony, supra note 23, at 5.
2005 COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 22, at 5 n.8.
See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-101.
Id.
Id.
Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209 (1972).

GURIAN_CHRISTENSEN

136

2/3/2011 10:12 PM

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XXXIII

highest priority,” 164 that Court concluded that “only a generous
construction” of its provisions would give vitality to those provisions and
carry out the purposes of the statute.165 In passing the Restoration Act, the
Council was depending on the judiciary to play a comparable role today.
F. Illustrations of the Intended Construction Principles
As the City Human Rights Law is hereafter used, there will emerge
numerous areas for interpretation beyond those brought to the Council’s
attention. This fact should not operate to suggest any limitation of the
liberal construction principles that are the focus of this article.166
Nevertheless, there were quite a few areas of concern that did animate the
Restoration Act, and an examination of those is instructive, both for the
particular resolution intended, and for their illustrative value.
1. First order of business
Four cases were consistently identified by name as inconsistent with
statutory language and purposes: McGrath, Levin, Forrest, and Priore.
Council Member Palma’s statement regarding the intent and consequences
of the bill stated flatly: “With Intro 22, these cases, and others like them,
will no longer hinder vindication of our civil rights.”167 The areas of law to
164. Id. at 211.
165. Id. at 212.
166. Cf. Mayers v. Ridley, 465 F.2d 630 (D.C. Cir 1972). In that case, the D.C. Circuit,
empanelled en banc, treated a question not specifically addressed in the Fair Housing Act:
did the Act cover a Recorder of Deeds who had been accepting and filing racially restrictive
covenants? The lead concurrence began by acknowledging that “there is nothing in the
legislative history tending either to support or to refute the inference arising from the
language that the Act prohibits statements of racial preference emanating from the
Recorder’s office,” and by noting that, “[i]n all likelihood, few congressmen even addressed
their thinking to this particular problem.” Id. at 634. That acknowledgment, however, did
not operate as evidence that coverage should not lie: “no court has ever held that Congress
must specifically indicate how a statute should be applied in every case before the judiciary
can go about the business of applying it.” Id. at 634. The opinion pointed to a then-recent
Supreme Court decision which had recognized that:
“[M]ost Congressional discussion of the public accommodations of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 had focused on places of spectator entertainment, not
recreational areas.” Nonetheless, the Supreme Court had held the Act applicable
to a lake club with boating and dancing facilities, remarking that the Act’s
coverage should not be “restricted to the primary objects of Congress’ concern”
since the purpose of the law was “to remove the daily affront and humiliation
involved in discriminatory denials of access to facilities ostensibly open to the
general public.”
Id. at 634–35. The Ridley Court, too, was unwilling to restrict the reach of the Fair Housing
Act to “the primary objects of Congress’ concern.” Id. at 634.
167. Each of these four cases was also cited as an example of improper judicial
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which these cases (erroneously) spoke are treated first.
i. McGrath: Attorneys fees in “nominal damages” cases
In rejecting McGrath’s importation of Farrar and making clear that
attorney’s fees are available in cases that result in only nominal damages,
courts will (1) avoid importing a restriction not mentioned by the language
of the City Human Rights Law and not contemplated by the 1991
Amendments, (2) further the ability of victims of discrimination to secure
counsel, and (3) thereby vindicate the statute’s intent to see that no instance
of discrimination is allowed to stand unchallenged. The phrase “victim of
discrimination” is deliberate: the only people being denied fees under the
McGrath/Farrar rule are those who have proved to a jury’s satisfaction that
the defendant did engage in an unlawful discriminatory practice.168
ii. Levin: Marital status
Consider the following exchange between a landlord and a couple to
whom he has shown an available apartment:
Landlord: Did you like it?
Couple: We did. We’d like to rent it.
Landlord: Are you married?
Couple: No.
Landlord: Well, because you are not married, I will not rent the
apartment to you.
Couple: Is there any other reason?
Landlord: No.
One might think that this is a straightforward single-motive, intentional
discrimination case. The City Human Rights Law has long prohibited
housing discrimination on the basis of marital status. 169 As early as 1977,
the City Human Rights Commission considered the argument of a landlord
who “believed that unmarried persons planning to live together would be

construction. See Bar Association Letter, supra note 23, at 1 n.1; Brennan Center
Statement, supra note 23, at 3 n.4, 5 n.6, and 6 n.8; Center Testimony, supra note 23, at 2
nn.1-4.
168. It is true that the most harsh effects of Farrar can theoretically be avoided in federal
court if the plaintiff seeks and is granted equitable relief, although in McGrath, such relief
was not sought. Leaving aside the infrequency with which such relief is granted in an
individual case where only nominal money damages are awarded, there is an additional
problem for cases brought in state court. New York has a rule that strongly discourages the
inclusion of a demand for equitable relief: the plaintiff who does so loses the right to a jury
trial.
169. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-107(5)(a)(1). The provision was added in 1973.
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more likely to have financial difficulties culminating in the breaking of
The
their lease than would married persons living together.” 170
Commission rejected the argument:
It was subjective decisions of this very type, so clearly mired on
preconceived stereotypical attitudes, which served to make finding
housing so great a problem for unmarried people, and which was in large
part responsible for the legislative enactment under which this
Commission’s jurisdiction has been involved in this case. 171

New York’s highest court, however, has seen things differently. In
rulings most recently affirmed in Levin v. Yeshiva University, the Court of
Appeals has held that protection against being intentionally discriminated
against on the basis of marital status only applies to an individual who has
been discriminated against, not to persons who have been discriminated
against because of a “disqualifying relationship.”172 In the court’s
conception, “marital status” corresponds only to the box an individual
would check off on a form.
The court did not consider the fact that the City Human Rights Law
provision in question states that a housing provider is forbidden to withhold
or deny housing “from any person or group of persons” based on the
protected class status (including marital status) of “such person or
persons,” 173 and did not consider that the common understanding of
“marital status” encompasses the status of a couple. 174 In the illustrative
conversation cited above, for example, it would be the very unusual
landlord who would have been satisfied with the answer “Yes, each of us is
a ‘married person,’” if the two people were having an affair (and were only
married persons in the sense of being married to others). In the real world,
the landlord was asking, “Are you married to one another?” 175

170. Mandel v. Reinhart, No. 6481-H, 1977 WL 52818, at *7 (N.Y.C. Com. Hum. Rts.,
Feb. 28, 1977) (decision and order).
171. Id. at *7.
172. Levin v. Yeshiva Univ., 754 N.E.2d 1099, 1102 (N.Y. 2001)). As was pointed out
in Center testimony, the case did not purport to analyze the right of an unmarried individual
to be free from intentional discrimination in the terms and conditions of a rental or sale, and
did not purport to deal with disparate impact claims. Center Testimony, supra note 23, at 2
n.2.
173. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-107(5)(a)(1).
174. Cf. Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm’n., 12 Cal. 4th 1143, 1155 (Sup. Ct.
1996) (“To determine what a statute means, ‘we first consult the words themselves, giving
them their usual and ordinary meaning.’ The usual and ordinary meaning of the words
‘marital status,’ as applied to two prospective tenants is that a landlord may not ask them
whether they are married or refuse to rent to them because they are, or are not.”) (internal
citation and footnote omitted).
175. In the course of more than two years of work on what became the Restoration Act,
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Not surprisingly, the Court did not–either in Levin or in the predecessor
cases–consider what interpretation of marital status would best fulfill the
purposes of the statute, nor did it consider the City Human Rights Law
independently of its consideration of the State Human Rights Law. A rule
that only prohibits a landlord from excluding all unmarried persons
(regardless of whether they are living alone or together) leaves a great deal
of room for the kind of stereotypical assumptions about marital status to
play a role in decisions relating to housing, the very assumptions that had
long ago been condemned by the Commission on Human Rights.
The Council specifically contemplated that Levin could not stand in the
face of the expanded and revived liberal construction provision, and
anticipated that courts would be obliged to strike it down. In the meantime,
the Council added protection for registered domestic partners,176 but that
protection is only an “interim measure.” 177 As the 2005 Committee Report
put it, the domestic partnership protection was being enacted “[p]ending
judicial reconsideration of the proper scope of protection from
discrimination based on marital status. . . . “ 178
The decision to create an interim solution arose from objections that had
been raised by the Bloomberg Administration to the language in the
original version of the bill. That language had defined marital status to
include the status of a person “in relation to another person,” without any
qualification whatsoever as to the nature of the relationship between the
two people involved. 179 The Bloomberg Administration repeatedly
denounced the proposed provision as unintentionally extending protections
far beyond the Council’s desire to stop discrimination against unmarried
couples. 180 The Council’s solution, as noted above, was to have the courts
and conversations with literally hundreds of people, the task of explaining the Court’s
conception of marital status was more difficult than anything else. Each and every person
found the Court’s cramped interpretation of marital status either entirely counterintuitive or
incomprehensible, or both.
176. See infra notes 311-13 and accompanying text.
177. Center Testimony, supra note 23, at 7 (pointing out that “the broader question will
have to be revisited after the courts have re-examined their previous marital status rulings in
light of each and all of the requirements of revised Section 8-130”).
178. 2005 COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 22, at 2.
179. See Intro 439 of 2003 (the predecessor bill to Intro 22), NEW YORK CITY COUNCIL
PROCEEDINGS 1518 (2003) and the original version of Intro 22, NEW YORK CITY COUNCIL
PROCEEDINGS 338 (2004).
180. The Commission on Human Rights first claimed that the language “extends the law
to protect based upon personality traits, individual qualities and characteristics.” Comm’r
Patricia Gatling, New York City Commission on Human Rights, Statement at Hearing of
New York City Council Committee on General Welfare 2 (Oct. 16, 2003) (on file with
Committee on General Welfare). A year later, the Commission still thought the language
was too broad:
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draw the parameters of “couples” protection as part of the judiciary’s
liberal construction function. 181
The task is one that the courts should readily be able to handle. In
Braschi v. Stahl Co., for example, New York’s Court of Appeals was faced
with the problem of how to define “family” for the purpose of determining
who has survivor protection from eviction pursuant to the rent control
laws. 182 In that case, the Court of Appeals recognized that statutes are to
be interpreted “so as to avoid objectionable consequences and to prevent
hardship or injustice,” and that, “where doubt exists as to the meaning of a
term, and a choice between two constructions is afforded, the consequences
that may result from the different interpretations should be considered.”183
The court went on to point out that, “since rent-control laws are remedial in
nature and designed to promote the public good, their provisions should be
interpreted broadly to effectuate their purposes.”184
The court concluded that the term “family”
should not be rigidly restricted to those people who have formalized their
relationship by obtaining, for instance, a marriage certificate or an
adoption order. The intended protection against sudden eviction should
not rest on fictitious legal distinctions or genetic history, but instead
should find its foundation in the reality of family life. In the context of
eviction, a more realistic, and certainly equally valid, view of a family
includes two adult lifetime partners whose relationship is long term and
characterized by an emotional and financial commitment and
interdependence. This view comports both with our society’s traditional
concept of “family” and with the expectations of individuals who live in

I’m still not clear on what the class of people are. I’ll give you an example:
Before I got married, I had a roommate for 12 years. We lived in an apartment
together. We shared household expenses. We even had a summer house that we
rented together with a group of other people. That I assume would not be the type
of relationship you’re looking to protect. Yet the way this is written or the way I
understand the proposal as the definition of marital status. I would think that’s
inappropriate.
Clifford Mulqueen, General Counsel, New York City Commission on Human Rights,
Testimony at Hearing of New York City Council Committee on General Welfare 73-74
(Sept. 22, 2004) (transcript on file with the New York City Clerk’s Office).
181. See supra text accompanying notes 172-74. While the Council did step back from
its initial language protecting even two people with the most tenuous ties between them,
there is, of course, no evidence that the Council was seeking to narrow the scope that the
existing marital status provision would have given to unmarried couples had the Levin court
paid heed to the intentions of the framers of the 1991 Amendments, nor any evidence that
the Council wanted to exempt marital status from the enhanced liberal construction
requirements of the Restoration Act.
182. Braschi v. Stahl Co., 543 N.E.2d 49, 50–51 (N.Y. 1989).
183. Id. at 52.
184. Id. (internal citations omitted).
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such nuclear units. 185

After the court had acted, the holding was codified in regulation, and
affords protection where there is a showing of “emotional and financial
commitment, and interdependence” between the two people involved.186
In the context of marital status protection for couples, the same principles
referenced in Braschi demand, at minimum, that couples who hold
themselves out as “partners” (that is, two people with an emotional and
financial commitment to, and interdependence between, each other) be
protected as couples against discrimination.187
iii. Forrest: Vicarious liability
As discussed above in part I.B.3, and as described to the Council,
Forrest disregarded the distinct language and legislative history of the 1991
Amendments which had established strict employer liability for the acts of
employees who exercised supervisory or managerial responsibility. The
case also disregarded the fact that the affirmative defense available under
the City Human Rights Law was narrower than that available under the
Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense the Supreme Court later created in
1998. The City Law, after all, treated an employer’s “reasonable steps to
prevent” as only being relevant to liability in non-supervisory, nonmanagerial harassment situations. Neither Forrest’s importation of a state
vicarious liability standard contrary to the express language of the City
Law, nor the case’s importation of a federal affirmative defense
inconsistent with the City Law, can have continuing vitality.
iv. Priore: Individual liability
As pointed out to the Council, this, too, is an area where a court simply
refused to apply the language of the law. 188 Most other courts had
previously recognized that the Council, having proscribed in 1991
discrimination not only by an employer, but by “an employee or agent
thereof,” meant that discrimination by employees or agents of employers
was also to be prohibited. If the First Department had thought that the
Council had not really meant to move beyond the proscriptions of State
185. Id. at 53–54 (emphasis added).
186. New York City Rent and Eviction Regulations, N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9,
§ 2204.6(d) (1993).
187. Independent of what comes to be done in terms of protecting couples as couples, it
bears repetition that Levin did not foreclose claims by an unmarried individual that he or she
was being discriminated against in terms and conditions either intentionally or as a matter of
disparate impact.
188. See Brennan Center Statement, supra note 23, at 6.
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law, 189 the Restoration Act makes that belief impossible to sustain, and
Priore must be abandoned.
2. Key challenges 190
i. Abandoning the “severe or pervasive” requirement in harassment cases
An employer has two high-paid employees in a particular department,
one man and one woman. The employer tells the woman that, because of
her gender, she will henceforth be paid ten cents less per hour than her
male counterpart. Though the gross economic loss (assuming a fifty hour
week) is only five dollars per week (less, after taxes), the woman would be
able to tell her employer with confidence that the employer’s action is
prohibited pursuant to Title VII. “I am entitled,” she says, “not to be
discriminated against in the terms and conditions of my employment.” The
fact that her out-of-pocket damages are small does not undercut the fact
that a gender-based distinction in terms and conditions has been effected.
In other words, liability is one issue and damages another.
When it comes to harassment claims, however, the courts conflate the
issues of liability and damages. As most recently summarized by the
Supreme Court in Clark County School District v. Breeden, “sexual
harassment is actionable under Title VII only if it is so severe or pervasive
as to alter the conditions of [the victim’s] employment and create an
abusive working environment.” 191 The Court went on to underline the fact
that a “recurring point in [our] opinions is that simple teasing, offhand
comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not
amount to discriminatory changes in the ‘terms and conditions of
employment.’” 192
The “severe or pervasive” rule invited lower courts to “discriminate
against one term or condition of employment by assigning a significantly

189. This belief had no basis in fact. See infra notes 75–90 and accompanying text.
190. The illustrations that follow are not designed to suggest that other issues brought to
the Council’s attention are not important for courts to examine. For example, the scope of
what constitutes “adverse action” needs to be reexamined. A restrictive interpretation both
undermines enforcement of the statute, and is inconsistent with the concerns that animated
the Council’s elimination of the materiality requirement in retaliation cases. The parameters
of the “continuing violation” doctrine need to be explored anew, especially since, as of the
1991 Amendments—and, indeed, until the Supreme Court’s decision in National Rail Road
Corporation v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002)—there was a split among the circuits in terms
of the applicability of continuing violation theory, even under Title VII.
191. Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 270 (2001) (internal citations
omitted).
192. Id. at 271.
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lower importance to the right to work in an atmosphere free from
discrimination.” 193 As a result, there is a wide range of conduct—all of it
treating one person less well than another because of gender—which courts
tolerate.
In a recent case in New York, 194 for example, a plaintiff had alleged
that, in the course of a five month period, the defendant’s vice-president
(who was also head of the sales department): had repeatedly told her–in the
presence of other employees–that she was “sleeping with the wrong
employee”; 195 had photographed himself at a party “placing his hand on
[plaintiff’s] upper thigh and pulling her skirt up two or three inches”; had
twice said in the presence of other employees that he should accompany
plaintiff on vacation (instead of her boyfriend); had, on about half-a-dozen
occasions, approached plaintiff from behind while she was working and
“placed his hands on her back, neck or shoulders and leaned into her”; had
at least one conversation with plaintiff about how “hot” she was and “the
type of underwear she wore”; and, after a partition was, at plaintiff’s
request, installed around her desk to protect her from the vice-president,
who would “leer” at plaintiff as he went by her workspace.196
The judge, citing the fact that the conduct occurred “intermittently” over
a five or six-month period, concluded that it was “not particularly
‘frequent’ under the Title VII standard.” 197
Characterizing the conduct to which plaintiff alleged she was subjected
as “occasional touching, rude comments, and hostile stares,”198 the judge
concluded that this conduct “cannot be said to amount to more than
‘relatively innocuous incidences of overbearing or provocative behavior.’
As such, they do not reach the requisite level of employment-altering
severity.” 199
As detailed in License to Harass, trivialization of harassment as seen in
Schiano is a frequent occurrence, and there are a variety of techniques used
to insulate employers from liability for conduct that treats women poorly

193. Judith J. Johnson, License to Harass Women: Requiring Hostile Environment Sexual
Harassment to be “Severe or Pervasive” Discriminates Among “Terms and Conditions” of
Employment, 62 MD. L. REV. 85, 87 (2003).
194. Schiano v. Quality Payroll Sys., Inc., No. 03CV492(DRH)(ETB), 2005 WL
1638167 (E.D.N.Y. July 12, 2005).
195. The vice-president apparently knew that plaintiff was “romantically involved” with
a co-employee. Id. at *1.
196. Id. at *1-2.
197. Id. at *4.
198. Id. at *5.
199. Id.

GURIAN_CHRISTENSEN

144

2/3/2011 10:12 PM

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XXXIII

merely because they are women. 200 These include requiring that the
conduct be severe and pervasive (instead of severe or pervasive), and
include the phenomenon of courts “tolerating conduct that would be
considered sexual assault or attempted sexual assault under the criminal
law” and requiring “proof that the conduct tangibly affected the plaintiff’s
job performance.” 201 Other techniques include parsing evidence to avoid a
finding of severe or pervasive; and rejecting “evidence of harassment that
occurred before the employer took some remedial action even though it
does not stop the harassment.” 202
While the Supreme Court sees the “severe or pervasive” standard as
important to preventing “Title VII from expanding into a general civility
code,” 203 the focus of the City Human Rights Law in light of the 1991
Amendments and the Restoration Act is different. Its focus is instead
making certain that discrimination not play any role in the workplace or
elsewhere.
In fact, at the time the 1991 Amendments were being considered and
enacted, the City Commission on Human Rights had questioned the
prevailing federal standard. In 1989, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
of the Commission had made a post-hearing recommendation that the
Commission dismiss a case that had revolved around one alleged incident
of harassment, and the Commission affirmed the view of its Law
Enforcement Bureau that the ALJ had “applied the wrong standard” for
determining liability in a sexual harassment case, stating: “The Bureau
correctly notes that the Commission is not bound by federal civil rights
law. The New York City Human Rights Law is a separate and independent
statute. Indeed, in many instances the City’s law provides victims of
discrimination with broader protection than that provided by federal
law.” 204 The Commission remanded the case to the ALJ for further
consideration of the “proper standard.” 205
On remand, the ALJ explained that he agreed that, if proven, “[a] single
act of harassment . . . would be sufficient to constitute sexual harassment,”
but because his decision was based on a determination that the complainant
was not credible, he again recommended that the case be dismissed.206
200. Johnson, supra note 193, at 111–34.
201. Id. at 111, 115.
202. Id. at 111, 115, 131-33.
203. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998).
204. Murphy v. John Foleros King Pub, No. 03124079-EP, slip op. at 2 (N.Y.C. Com.
Hum. Rts., Oct. 12, 1989) (decision and order) (on file with the library of New York City’s
Office of Administrative Trials and Hearings (OATH)).
205. Id. at 2-3.
206. It was alleged that a proprietor of the defendant had put his hand up the
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When the Commission reviewed the recommendation in April of 1990, the
Commission rejected it, citing “complex and important credibility issues,”
and decided to constitute a panel of three Commissioners to “consider and
suggest guidelines for hearing and deciding sexual harassment cases.” 207
No further action was taken prior to the 1991 Amendments, and, thus at
the time of their enactment, there was an open question to be considered by
the Commission as to what standard to apply in light of the fact that the
City Human Rights Law is a “separate and independent statute.” Sadly,
this matter was not ultimately considered–in 1994, early in the Giuliani
Administration, the Commission decided that a further hearing was not
necessary. It did so simply as a matter of agreeing that the complainant had
not presented sufficient credible evidence, not as an analysis of the legal
standard. 208
The need to address this issue was argued to the Council during the
consideration of the Restoration Act by multiple parties in connection with
the need for enhanced liberal construction language. 209 A simple solution
(one that neither turns the City Human Rights Law into a general civility
code nor a shield for discriminators) would adopt a standard which attaches
liability whenever the covered entity is shown to have treated the plaintiff
less favorably than others because of a protected status—regardless of the
level of pervasiveness or severity of the discriminatory harassment —
unless a covered entity demonstrated as an affirmative defense that the
discriminatory harassment complained of consisted of no more than what a
reasonable victim of discrimination would consider petty slights and trivial
complainant’s skirt. Murphy v. John Foleros King Pub, No. 03124079-EP, slip op. at 2
(N.Y.C. Com. Hum. Rts., Mar. 6, 1990) (recommended decision and order on remand) (on
file with the library of New York City’s Office of Administrative Trials and Hearings
(OATH)).
207. Murphy v. John Foleros King Pub, No. 03124079-EP, slip op. at 3-4 (N.Y.C. Com.
Hum. Rts., Apr. 25, 1990) (en banc) (decision and order) (on file with the library of New
York City’s Office of Administrative Trials and Hearings (OATH)).
208. Murphy v. John Foleros King Pub, Complaint 03124079-EP (N.Y.C. Com. Hum.
Rts., May 26, 1994) (decision and order) (on file with the library of New York City’s Office
of Administrative Trials and Hearings (OATH)).
209. See Brennan Center Statement, supra note 23, at 5 (complaining that “without any
consideration of what standard would best further the purposes of the City Law, women
who have been sexually harassed are routinely thrown out of court without getting a chance
to have a jury hear their claims because a judge uses the federal standard that they have not
been harassed enough”); Center Testimony, supra note 23, at 2 (“We have long had the
problem of judges insisting that harassment [has] to be ‘severe or pervasive’ before it is
actionable, even though such a requirement unduly narrows the reach of the law.”); Kathryn
Lake Mazierski, President, New York State National Organization for Women, Testimony
at Hearing of the New York City Council’s Comm’n on Gen. Welfare 50 (Sept. 22, 2004)
(transcript on file with New York City Clerk’s Office) (noting that the federal standard
“continually hurts women”).
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annoyances.
The elimination of the “severe or pervasive” requirement, coupled with
the addition of a burden shift, would tackle the real issue: too many judges
are unwilling to allow juries to evaluate contested issues in the sexual
harassment context, preferring to arrogate the fact-determining role unto
themselves (via the improper granting of motions for summary judgment).
If a defendant had the burden of persuasion that the conduct complained of
consisted of “no more than petty slights and trivial annoyances,” summary
judgment would be improvidently granted far less frequently than it is now.
As the Second Circuit has recently reaffirmed,
A party faces a significantly heightened standard to obtain judgment as a
matter of law on an issue as to which that party bears the burden of proof.
“It is rare that the party having the burden of proof on an issue at trial is
entitled to a directed verdict.” Granite Computer Leasing Corp. v.
Travelers Indem. Co., 894 F.2d 547, 551 (2d Cir.1990). Indeed, “[a]
verdict should be directed in such instances only if the evidence in favor
of the movant is so overwhelming that the jury could rationally reach no
other result.” Id. See also Yurman Design, Inc. v. PAJ, Inc., 262 F.3d
101, 109 (2d Cir. 2001); 9 Moore’s Federal Practice § 50.05 (2004)
(“[G]ranting judgment as a matter of law for a party who bears the burden
of proof is an extreme step that may be taken only when the evidence
favoring the movant is so one-sided that, absent adequate evidentiary
response by the nonmovant, it could not be disbelieved by a reasonable
jury.”). 210

This result will not please all stakeholders, but its appropriateness is
measured, as with other areas of the law, by how competing values are to
be properly weighed. For some judges, for example, the most pressing
concern may be that, if summary judgment motions are not readily granted,
“we are allowing disgruntled employees to impose the costs of trial on
employers who, although they have not acted with the intent to
discriminate, may have treated their employees unfairly.”211 A very
different value system acknowledges that “the hostile judicial climate in
relation to [sexual harassment] claims means that many victims of sexual
harassment never step forward. Many of [those] who do are usually
informed by attorneys that the way the law stands now, their claims will
not be taken seriously.” 212
The pattern of the City Human Rights Law—its preferred method of
balancing or weighing values—is to focus its concern on removing the

210. Fairbrother v. Morrison, 412 F.3d 39, 53 (2d Cir. 2005).
211. Bray v. Marriott Hotels, 110 F.3d 986, 1003 (3d Cir. 1997) (Alito, J., dissenting).
212. Mazierski, supra note 209, at 48-49.
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inhibitions that prevent victims from coming forward, and to accept the
cost of trial for covered entities as a necessary price of doing everything
possible to eliminate all forms of discrimination. And in this particular
area, as the Second Circuit has noted, it is especially important that juries
get to play their role:
Today, while gender relations in the workplace are rapidly evolving, and
views of what is appropriate behavior are diverse and shifting, a jury
made up of a cross-section of our heterogeneous communities provides
the appropriate institution for deciding whether borderline situations
should be characterized as sexual harassment and retaliation.
The factual issues in this case cannot be effectively settled by a decision
of an Article III judge on summary judgment. Whatever the early life of a
federal judge, she or he usually lives in a narrow segment of the
enormously broad American socio-economic spectrum, generally lacking
the current real-life experience required in interpreting subtle sexual
dynamics of the workplace based on nuances, subtle perceptions, and
implicit communications. 213

Disaggregating liability and damages in the manner suggested will still
allow covered entities the tools needed to defend themselves against truly
trivial charges and against damages out of proportion to the harm suffered,
but will make an important contribution to the fight to eliminate genderbased discrimination—regardless of whether that discrimination manifests
itself in pay disparities, promotional disparities, or harassment.
ii. No artificial limits on reasonable accommodation
The Second Circuit, in a 2-1 decision constituting a significant blow
against the rights of people with disabilities, ruled in 1998 that it is
“fundamental” that the Fair Housing Act “addresses the accommodation of
handicaps, not the alleviation of economic disadvantages that may be
correlated with having handicaps.” 214 The case involved plaintiffs who
alleged that they were unable to work because they were disabled, and thus
needed the assistance of the federal Section 8 program.
The
accommodation requested was a waiver of the landlord’s policy against
allowing Section 8 tenants.
The Second Circuit majority thought this sort of accommodation was not
contemplated by the Fair Housing Act: “What stands between these
plaintiffs and the apartments [at issue] is a shortage of money, and nothing

213. Gallagher v. Delaney, 139 F.3d 338, 342 (2d Cir. 1998).
214. Salute v. Stratford Greens Garden Apartments, 136 F.3d 293, 301 (2d Cir. 1998).
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else.” 215 For the majority, the Fair Housing Act did not “elevate the rights
of the handicapped poor over the rights of the non-handicapped poor.
Economic discrimination . . . is not cognizable as a failure to make
reasonable accommodations . . . .” 216 The majority contrasted what it
considered an accommodation appropriately linked to a disability: when a
seeing-eye dog is permitted despite a “no pets” policy, wrote the majority,
that accommodation responds directly to a disability. 217
Salute was decided before the Supreme Court’s decision in U.S. Airways
v. Barnett, a case arising under the Americans with Disabilities Act. 218
That case held that a person with a disability similarly situated to a person
without a disability may have preference (an accommodation) if the
accommodation responds to the need created by the disability, even if the
policy in question poses barriers to the non-disabled person as well. As the
Supreme Court pointed out: “Were that not so, the ‘reasonable
accommodation’ provision could not accomplish its intended objective . . .
[m]any employers will have neutral rules governing the kinds of actions
most needed to reasonably accommodate a worker with a disability.”219
The case also rejected Justice Scalia’s reasoning that a policy that burdens
the disabled and non-disabled alike is therefore not a disability-related
obstacle. 220
In view of Barnett, it seems unlikely that Salute could survive as a
matter of Fair Housing Act jurisprudence. Indeed, a post-Barnett case,
Giebeler v. M&B Associates, 221 dealt with the case of a man who did not
have earned income because his disability rendered him unable to work.
The man sought to have his mother, a financially responsible person, be a
co-signer on the lease, and wanted to have the landlord’s “no co-signer”
policy waived. Permitting the co-signing would have caused the landlord
no financial harm; on the contrary, the proposed co-signer met the
landlord’s financial qualifications. Nevertheless, the landlord refused. The
Ninth Circuit found that the waiver of the policy represented, first of all, a
type of accommodation contemplated by the Fair Housing Act, and, as

215. Id. at 302.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 301-02.
218. U.S. Airways v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002). Though Barnett was an Americans
with Disabilities Act case, courts interpreting the disability rights provisions of the Fair
Housing Act frequently analogize to the ADA. See, e.g., Tsombinidis v. West Haven Fire
Dep’t, 352 F.3d 565, 573 (2d Cir. 2003).
219. Barnett, 535 U.S. at 398.
220. See id. at 413.
221. 343 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 2003).
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applied to the facts of the case, was a reasonable accommodation. 222
Giebeler adopted the reasoning of the dissent in Salute, which had
pointed out that, in the seeing-eye dog and other examples cited by the
Second Circuit majority:
[I]t is not the handicap itself that is directly accommodated by the change
in a policy. Rather, it is the need that was created by the particular
handicap that is accommodated. Thus, a person’s blindness creates the
need for a seeing-eye dog, and a person’s multiple sclerosis leads to
impaired mobility, which, in turn, creates the need for a priority parking
space close to the tenant’s residence. 223

Having identified the request for a waiver of the “no-cosigner” policy as
an “accommodation,” the Ninth Circuit found that: (1) the plaintiff had
demonstrated that the proposed accommodation was reasonable on its face;
and that (2) the defendant had failed to meet its burden of showing that, in
the particular circumstances, agreeing to the request would have caused it
undue hardship. 224
Whatever the ultimate result under the Fair Housing Act, the type of
accommodation sought in the Giebeler case would certainly be covered
under the City Human Rights Law. In contrast to the ADA, the threshold
coverage provisions of which the Supreme Court has felt the need to
interpret “strictly” to make certain that no more people are covered than
Congress intended, 225 the City Human Rights Law has no such concerns.
Not only does the Restoration Act’s overall focus on the broadest possible
coverage preclude judicial carving out of a category of accommodation, the
disability provisions themselves offer specific additional evidence of the
desire to go even further than the Fair Housing Act or the ADA.
For example, one has a “disability” for purposes of City Human Rights
Law regardless of whether one’s impairment substantially limits one in a
major life activity or not.226 Housing providers have qualitatively more
extensive obligations regarding modifications to premises than are required
under the Fair Housing Act. 227 The obligation to make accommodation
arises not only where a covered entity actually knows of a disability, but
222. Id. at 1145.
223. Salute, 136 F.3d at 308 (Calebresi, J., dissenting), cited with approval in Giebeler,
343 F.3d at 1153.
224. Giebeler, 343 F.3d at 1140-42.
225. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197-98 (2002) (stating its
conclusion that the terms “need to be interpreted strictly to create a demanding standard for
qualifying as disabled is confirmed by the first section of the ADA, which lays out the
legislative findings and purposes that motivate the Act”).
226. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-102(16)(a).
227. See discussion infra notes 252-256 and accompanying text.
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also where the covered entity should know of a disability. 228
Most importantly, the accommodation language itself is framed
extremely broadly. The requirement is to make reasonable accommodation
to the “needs” of persons with disabilities (not to “disabilities” directly).229
The law also sets out a different analysis than pertains under federal law.
A plaintiff does have to identify an accommodation that would enable
him to overcome a disability-generated need “to enjoy the right or rights in
question,” 230 but “reasonable accommodation” is defined as “such
accommodation that can be made that shall not cause undue hardship in the
conduct of the covered entity’s business.” 231 Every accommodation,
therefore, that “can be made” is reasonable except for those a covered
entity proves would pose an “undue hardship.” 232 The category of
accommodations under federal law that are “unreasonable” though they do
not cause “undue hardship,” 233 simply does not exist under the City Law.
Finally, the City Law places the burden of persuasion on a covered entity
on the question of whether the person with a disability could, with the
proposed accommodation, enjoy the rights in question. 234
Because a waiver of a “no co-signer” or “no guarantor” rule of the sort at
issue in Giebeler could enable a person unable to work because of a
disability to rent or buy an apartment, such an accommodation is required
by the City Human Rights Law unless the covered entity could prove that,
in the particular circumstance, the waiver would cause an undue hardship.
The issues raised by the conflicting cases of Salute and Giebeler were
much on the minds of those seeking the independent construction sought to
be guaranteed by the Restoration Act. 235 Similar issues, also appropriately
228. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-107(15)(a); 1991 LEG. ANN., supra note 3, at 163.
229. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-107(15)(a); 1991 LEG. ANN., supra note 3, at 163.
230. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-107(15)(a); 1991 LEG. ANN., supra note 3, at 163.
231. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-102(18); 1991 LEG. ANN., supra note 3, at 149.
232. The burden of persuasion of demonstrating undue hardship is placed on the
defendant. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-102(18); 1991 LEG. ANN., supra note 3, at 149.
233. Barnett, 535 U.S. at 401-21.
234. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-107(15)(b).
235. See, e.g., Edith Prentiss, Representative of Disabled In Action, Statement at Hearing
of the New York City Council Committee on General Welfare (Sept. 22, 2004) (on file with
the Committee):
Another problem is landlords who reject applicants able to pay rent from sources
other than a paycheck. Many landlords have a policy against permitting a parent
or other relative to co-sign, or be a guarantor on a lease. Reasonable
accommodation under existing law should mean that a landlord has to change that
policy in the case of a person with a disability. To do so causes no harm to the
landlord: he is assured of the rent. Nevertheless, landlords refuse to do so,
causing even more apartments to be off-limits to people with disabilities. . . . If a
person with a disability brought this kind of case in federal court in California,
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requiring accommodation under the local law, were brought up as well:
When someone is able to afford the rent with disability, pension, or other
unearned income, they should be allowed to do so, even if the landlord
usually requires earned income. When considering whether someone
does have enough money to afford an apartment, it is important for
landlords to accommodate people with disabilities by converting after-tax
income to its larger pre-tax equivalent. The strengthening of the liberal
construction provision of the law will help us in these respects as well. 236

The example of “converting after-tax income to its larger pre-tax
equivalent” represents another circumstance where people with disabilities
can be helped, without housing providers being hurt. When a housing
provider develops an income requirement, that housing provider is
contemplating that the income to be measured will involve pre-tax dollars.
The housing provider requires an income of “x” because the housing
provider understands that, after taxes, the prospective tenant will only have
seventy percent or eighty percent of “x” left over (depending on tax
bracket). A person with disabilities who is applying based on post-tax
funds does not need the higher gross amount in order to yield the seventy
percent or eighty percent “left over” that the housing provider is actually
looking for. Converting the post-tax funds of a person with disabilities to
their pre-tax equivalent is an accommodation that simply allows apples to
be compared with apples.
iii. No undervaluation of compensatory damages
Damage awards in the discrimination context have frequently been the
subject of reduction, by both trial and appellate courts. 237 It is the rare case
they would win. But in New York, they would lose because the court dismisses
this problem as being only ‘economic discrimination.’ The City Human Rights
Law offers a means independent of federal law by which to vindicate the rights of
qualified applicants. But it will only work if the law is amended, as is proposed
by Intro 22, to require courts to interpret the local law independent of federal law,
with a view towards liberally interpreting the statute to accomplish its broad
objectives.
Id.
236. Alexander Wood, Executive Director, Disabilities Network of New York City,
Statement at Hearing of New York City Council Committee on General Welfare (Sept. 22,
2004) (on file with Committee).
237. New York courts have not hesitated to use their authority to determine that an award
is not “reasonably related to the wrongdoing” or not “comparable to other awards for similar
injuries.” See, e.g., Manhattan and Bronx Surface Transit Operating Auth. v. New York
State Executive Dep’t, 632 N.Y.S.2d 642, 644 (App. Div. 1995) (purporting to apply these
standards to reduce a $30,000 mental anguish award to $7,500 in an age discrimination case
conducted before the State Division on Human Rights). Likewise, federal courts have not
hesitated to apply the “shocks the judicial conscience test.” See Rainone v. Potter, 388 F.
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in which the fact that the injury is a discrimination injury is affirmatively
treated as placing the harm suffered in the category of “serious injury.”
Broome v. Biondi, 238 a case involving the discriminatory denial of an
application to sublet a co-op apartment, was one such case. There had been
limited testimony as to emotional distress. The court’s description is
reproduced here in full:
Shannon Broome stated that she felt embarrassed and humiliated by the
entire approval process and the ultimate denial of their sublet application.
She testified that she felt as if she were experiencing her “worst
nightmare.” Shannon Broome was reduced to tears during the June 13th
Beekman board interview, and again upon hearing the news that their
sublet application had been rejected. She also testified that she was
reluctant to tell her husband that the Beekman board rejected their
application because she “knew how much it was going to upset him.”
Gregory Broome testified that he felt “angry” and “demoralized” by the
hostile manner in which he and his wife were treated at the June 13th
interview and that “it was difficult for [his] feelings to go away.” He
described how he was especially humiliated that he had swallowed his
pride and submitted to the board’s interrogation during the June 13th
interview without defending himself or his wife. Gregory Broome also
stated that his confidence at work was affected by his “fear that clients
would somehow not trust [his] advice after they met [him].” Each of the
Broomes testified that they had to pass the Beekman Hill House every day
to reach a park to walk their dog and were reminded constantly of their
emotional pain caused by the board’s actions. 239

The jury awarded each plaintiff approximately $114,000 in emotional
distress damages and $205,000 each in punitive damages. Despite the
limited testimony, and despite the absence of medical testimony, the court

Supp. 2d 120, 122-23 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (reviewing the range within which awards have been
constricted and noting:
In the employment discrimination context, there appears to be a ‘spectrum’ or
‘continuum’ of damage awards for emotional distress. . . . At the low end of the
continuum are what have become known as ‘garden-variety’ distress claims in
which district courts have awarded damages for emotional distress ranging from
$5,000 to $35,000. . . . The middle of the spectrum consists of ‘significant’
($50,000 up to $100,000) and ‘substantial’ emotional distress claims
($100,000). . . . Finally, on the high end of the spectrum are ‘egregious’
emotional distress claims, where the courts have upheld or remitted awards for
distress to a sum in excess of $100,000. These awards have only been warranted
where the discriminatory conduct was outrageous and shocking or where the
physical health of plaintiff was significantly affected.
238. 17 F. Supp. 2d 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
239. Id. at 223 (transcript references omitted).
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denied a motion to reduce the awards.240 Citing what the court described
as “illuminating” research on the serious,241 ongoing costs of
discrimination, the court concluded that:
In the face of persistent housing discrimination which continues unabated
some 30 years after Congress passed the Fair Housing Act to stamp out
decades of such discriminatory behavior, the genuine emotional pain
associated with such discrimination should not be devalued by
unreasonably low compensatory damage awards, especially when one
considers the difficulty a plaintiff faces in establishing that he or she was
a victim of housing discrimination. 242

The Restoration Act echoes Broome’s message that the genuine pain
associated with discrimination claims should not be undervalued. The City
Human Rights Law’s purposes are said to be not only uniquely broad, they
are “uniquely broad and remedial.” 243 One of the core principles intended
by the Council to guide decision makers is that “victims of discrimination
suffer serious injuries, for which they ought to receive full
compensation.” 244
There are two possibilities to explain the frequency with which verdicts
are reduced: one is that judges need to be vigilant to guard against the
possibility of juries rendering awards without an adequate evidentiary basis
that injury has been suffered; the other is that juries recognize, in a way that
most judges are unwilling to, that exposure to discrimination is itself—
without more—a serious dignitary injury. Put another way, the vigilanceagainst-excessiveness school does not assign any baseline value to the
insult to dignity itself; the (much smaller) vigilance-against-unreasonablylow-awards school does so. The Restoration Act stands with the latter
camp, and thus counsels judges to defer more to a jury’s consideration of
the nature of the discrimination injury.
3. Resisting the urge to import exemptions not set forth in the local law
i. Disparate impact claims in the age discrimination context
The Supreme Court concluded in Smith v. City of Jackson, Mississippi245
240. Id. at 223-24 (citing, inter alia, to cases that had upheld mental anguish awards of
$150,000, $250,000, $450,000, and $500,000). Both plaintiffs’ lawyers and discrimination
defense lawyers would agree that these sustained awards represent the exception to the rule.
241. Id. at 225 n.9.
242. Id. at 226 (citations omitted).
243. Restoration Act, supra note 7, § 7 amending N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-130.
244. 2005 COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 22, at 5.
245. 125 S. Ct. 1536 (2005).
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that “the scope of disparate-impact liability under the [ADEA] is narrower
than under Title VII.” 246 One reason for this is that the ADEA, unlike Title
VII, has a provision insulating from disparate-impact liability employer
decisions based on a reasonable factor other than age. 247 The other reason
cited by the Court is the way that Congress legislatively overruled Ward’s
Cove, a case which had, inter alia, introduced requirements that made it
significantly more difficult for plaintiffs to prevail in disparate impact
cases. 248 When Congress rejected major aspects of the Court’s disparate
impact holding, it did so by amending Title VII, the statute that the
Supreme Court had been interpreting in Ward’s Cove. The Supreme Court
in Smith seized on the fact that Congress had not amended the ADEA as
evidence that Congress had implicitly endorsed the continued use of the
disparate impact standards of Ward’s Cove in the age discrimination
context. 249
The City Human Rights Law, on the other hand, has no “reasonable
factor of other than age” provision that limits its age discrimination
coverage. 250 Moreover, it has an independent, distinct, post-Ward’s Cove
provision governing disparate impact claims and the burdens of proof
relating thereto. That provision covers all types of discrimination,
including age, without qualification.251 Restrictions on disparate impact
claims applicable to the ADEA cannot, therefore, be said to be applicable
to the City Human Rights Law.
ii. Housing providers must make and pay for accommodations
Under the Fair Housing Act, as amended in 1988, housing providers
only need to permit a person with a disability to make reasonable
modifications to existing premises. 252 The modifications are to be made at
the expense of the person with a disability. 253 When the City Human
Rights Law was amended in 1991, it used quite different language. In
language directed at all covered entities (housing providers, employers,
246. Id. at 1545 (plurality opinion).
247. Id.
248. Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 653–60 (1989).
249. Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1544-45. While Congress would have been aware that courts
frequently analogize between and among different discrimination laws, the normal judicial
practice is to import good law, not rejected doctrine. As such, the idea that Congress would
have thought that it was necessary to act separately to amend the ADEA is curious, to say
the least; it certainly does not reflect liberal construction principles.
250. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-107(1).
251. Id. § 8-107(17).
252. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(a) (2005).
253. Id.
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etc.), it required covered entities to “make” reasonable accommodations.254
It did not include a provision requiring the person with a disability to pay
for the modifications. On the contrary, its distinctive accommodation
provision treats all accommodations that assist a person with a disability to
enjoy the housing or other right in question as reasonable, unless and until
the covered entity demonstrates that the accommodation would pose an
undue hardship. 255
Where a covered entity is able to demonstrate that making and paying
for an modification would cause it undue hardship, that covered entity is
not required to pay for the modification. Restricting the law by judicial
construction to allow covered entities to shirk their obligation to pay for
accommodation where to do so would not cause an undue hardship would
be contrary to the choices made by the City Council.256
iii. Damages are available for both impact and mixed motive violations
Under Title VII, damages are not permitted to be awarded against
defendants who have been found to have engaged in disparate impact
violations. 257 Likewise, where a plaintiff has demonstrated an intentional
discriminatory practice that was unlawfully motivated, and the defendant
has demonstrated that it would have taken the same action in the absence of

254. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-107(15)(a); 1991 LEG. ANN., supra note 3, 162-63. The
City law uses the term “accommodation” to refer both to “accommodations” and
“modifications.” See United Veterans Mutual Housing No. 2 Corp. v. N.Y. City Comm’n
on Human Rights, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 2, 1992, at 1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), aff’d, 616 N.Y.S.2d 84
(App. Div. 1994) (affirming an order of the Human Rights Commission to a housing
provider to establish a policy by which it would make and pay for all accommodations,
including common area modifications such as the installation and maintenance of ramps,
except where doing so would cause undue hardship and noting that the 1991 Amendments
mooted the challenge to the Commission’s interpretation by explicitly adopting the
Commission’s interpretation). The use of the single term “accommodation” is a reflection
of the fact that different contexts of discrimination (housing, employment, and public
accommodations) are covered by the one provision. Note that even under federal law,
physical modifications to the workplace are contemplated by the reasonable accommodation
provision of the Americans with Disabilities Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(a) (2005).
255. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-102(18) (“The term ‘reasonable accommodation’
means such accommodation that can be made that shall not cause undue hardship in the
conduct of the covered entity’s business. The covered entity shall have the burden of
proving undue hardship”.).
256. It should be noted that, in 2003, the Bloomberg Administration attempted to cut
back the scope of the law so that housing providers would only be responsible for paying for
modifications to common areas, not individual units. Its proposed amendment to the City’s
Human Rights Law was denominated “Intro 417 of 2003.” That bill was abandoned in the
face of opposition from the civil rights community.
257. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) (2005).
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the impermissible mitigating factor, no damages may be awarded.258
The City Human Rights Law, by contrast, contains neither restriction.
As to disparate impact, the 1991 Amendments treated disparate impact
violations merely as one type of violation to be codified in the “unlawful
discriminatory practices” section of the law. 259 At the same time, it recodified the section of the law dealing with the relief that could be ordered
by the Commission after a hearing which found that “any unlawful
discriminatory practice has occurred.”260 While making some changes—
like specifying the ability of the Commission to order a coop to approve a
coop sale—it left intact the provision that permits the award of
“compensatory damages to the person aggrieved by such practice.”261 The
phrase “such practice” refers unmistakably to “any unlawful discriminatory
practice,” without limitation.
Similarly, a judicial cause of action was defined by the 1991
Amendments to be one “for damages, including punitive damages, and for
injunctive relief and such other remedies as may be appropriate . . . .”262
The cause of action was available to anyone claimed to be aggrieved “by an
unlawful discriminatory practice defined in chapter one of this title.”263
Disparate impact violations are one such practice so defined. Again, no
exclusion was placed on the availability of damages.
Just as the 1991 Amendments did not exclude damages in the disparate
impact context, the Amendments did not exclude them in the context of a
covered entity which proved that it would have taken the same action
complained of, even in the absence of an impermissible motive. Naturally,
a defendant’s demonstration that it would have taken the same action
against a plaintiff even in the absence of an impermissible motive will
operate to limit or exclude some types of damages (e.g., backpay) in most
circumstances. Rather than being seen as a bar to all damages, however,
that demonstration is properly seen under the City Human Rights Law as a
factor to be considered in parsing and mitigating the damages to be
awarded.
The Commission on Human Rights did so in one of the few mixed
258. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(ii) (2005).
259. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-107 (“Unlawful Discriminatory Practices”); Id.§ 8-107(17)
(defining when an “unlawful discriminatory practice based on disparate impact” is
established).
260. Section 8-120(a) of the Administrative Code of the City of New York was replaced
with section 8-109(2)(c). See 1991 LEG. ANN., supra note 3, at 166 and 172.
261. Id. The compensatory damages provision is found at section 8-120(a)(7) of the
Administrative Code of New York.
262. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-502(a); 1991 LEG. ANN., supra note 3, at 177.
263. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-502(a); 1991 LEG. ANN., supra note 3, at 177.
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motive cases it decided.264 The Commission held that the legitimate
motives could be taken into account when fashioning the remedy, but,
explicitly contrasting its view of the City Law with that of Title VII, ruled
that a flat prohibition of damages was inappropriate. Taking the view that
“[a]n employee’s egregious conduct. . . does not justify an employer’s
unlawful discrimination,” the Commission awarded mental anguish
damages to a complainant who had been on the receiving end of an
explicitly bigoted epithet closely linked to his discharge. 265 Refusing to
exclude damages is a conclusion consistent with the Restoration Act’s
concern that every discrimination injury be treated as a serious injury. 266
In terms of punitive damages (and civil penalties to be awarded
administratively), the City Human Rights Law has had since 1991 an
explicit mechanism by which such damages or penalties may be
mitigated. 267 Mitigation is not elimination, however. A defendant’s
persistence in a policy that it knows or should know has a distinctly
disparate impact, where it has not bothered to examine less discriminatory
alternatives that are available, may well be one circumstance where some
punitives damages or civil penalties should be awarded. Likewise, in a
mixed motive context, the intentionally discriminatory features of a
candidate selection process are not retroactively insulated from
blameworthiness by the fact that the ultimate result was not altered by the
impermissible considerations.
4. No further rollback
i. Continuing to cover acts of post-acquisition harassment
The doctrine that the Fair Housing Act does not or may not cover acts of
264. In terms of liability, the Commission’s Administrative Law Judge ruled that once a
complainant demonstrated that “discriminatory animus played a motivating role in the
decision-making process,” the liability of the respondent was established. Cassas v. Lenox
Hill Hospital, No. EM-0191B-10/30/89-DES, 1997 WL 1052039, at *4 (N.Y.C. Com. Hum.
Rts., Feb. 6, 1997) (recommended decision and order). The ALJ further ruled that “[a]
complainant does not bear the burden of proving that discrimination was the sole reason,
true reason or principal reason an adverse employment action was taken.” Id. The
recommended decision and order was adopted by the Commission. Cassas v. Lenox Hill
Hosp., No. EM-01918-10/30/89-DES, 1997 WL 1051928 (N.Y.C. Com. Hum. Rts., Mar.
26, 1997) (decision and order).
265. Cassas, 1997 WL 1052039, at *8 (recommended decision and order), adopted,
Cassas v. Lenox Hill Hosp., 1997 WL 1051928 (N.Y.C. Com. Hum. Rts., Mar. 26, 1997)
(decision and order).
266. See 2005 COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 22, at 5-6; see also N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE §
8-101 (setting forth the intention that discrimination be prevented “from playing any role”).
267. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE §§ 8-107(13)(e), 8-126(b).
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post-acquisition conduct was invented by Judge Posner in 2004. 268 The
ruling was made in the face of HUD Regulations in effect since 1989 (that
is, at the time of the adoption both of the 1991 Amendments and of the
Restoration Act), which included on its list of “terms and conditions” those
violations which occur after a property has been acquired by sale or
lease. 269 Specifically, the regulations have prohibited failing or delaying
maintaining or repairing a dwelling, 270 and limiting the “use of privileges,
services or facilities associated with a dwelling.” 271
Halprin and its progeny were specifically cited in testimony to the
Council as an illustration of potential weakening of federal law against
which the Restoration Act would protect the local law. 272 The idea that a
covered entity would be permitted to harass an existing tenant because of
protected class is utterly repugnant to the City Human Rights Law’s broad
and inclusive proscriptions on discrimination, and could not properly be
imported. 273
ii. Preserving broad organizational standing
In 1982, the Supreme Court ruled in Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman274
that the Fair Housing Act had “conferred on all ‘persons’ a legal right to
truthful information about available housing,” without regard to race.275
This principle was used in Havens to grant standing to “testers” (persons
who act in an investigatory capacity for a fair housing organization, but
who have no actual intention to secure the property being viewed) 276 but is
not limited to testers alone. The definition of “person” in the Fair Housing
Act, like the City Human Rights Law, is broad, and encompasses a
corporation, 277 the usual form of not-for-profit fair housing organization.
268. Halprin v. Prairie Single Family Homes, 388 F.3d 327, 330 (7th Cir. 2004).
269. 24 C.F.R. § 100.65 (2005).
270. 24 C.F.R. § 100.65(b)(2) (2005).
271. 24 C.F.R. § 100.65(b)(4) (2005).
272. See Center Testimony, supra note 23, at 3; Brennan Statement, supra note 23, at 7
(“The independent construction provision would provide a buffer against the application of
the doctrines to the City’s Human Rights Law, and would help advocates argue against any
other ratcheting down of the local law based on narrowed understandings of state and
federal civil rights law.”).
273. For an extended discussion of why Halprin is “problematic,” “anomalous,” and
“clearly wrong,” even in terms of federal law, see ROBERT G. SCHWEMM, HOUSING
DISCRIMINATION, LAW AND LITIGATION 14 §§ 9-22 (2005).
274. 455 U.S. 363 (1982).
275. Id. at 373 (emphasis supplied; internal quotation in original).
276. Id.
277. 42 U.S.C. § 3602(d) (2005); N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-102(1). The 1991
Amendments broadened the City Law’s definition of “person” in a number of ways,
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A corporation, of course, can only act through its agents. 278 As such, a
fair housing not-for-profit seeks information through its agents (testers),
and is itself deprived of truthful information about available housing in
violation of the Havens rule if its agents are so deprived because of
protected class status. 279
This result is the only one consistent with Congress’ intent. Rather than
relying on government prosecutions alone, “Congress created this right so
that private persons could enforce the statute as private attorneys general
without running afoul of Article III.” 280 Private fair housing organizations
are the “persons” best suited to play the contemplated private attorneys
general role. Indeed, in 1992, as part of the Housing and Community
Development Act, Congress found, inter alia, that “their proven efficacy of
private nonprofit fair housing enforcement organizations and communitybased efforts makes support for these organizations a necessary component
of the fair housing enforcement system.” 281
Unlike the tester—who is but an agent of the testing organization, who
acquires information only for the testing organization, and who may have
only a transitory participation in fair housing work—a testing organization
is the tester’s principal, has ongoing participation in fair housing work and
is the ultimate recipient of the information (or misinformation) about
housing availability. The testing organization, therefore, has an even
stronger claim to standing than does the tester.
It would surprise no one if the Supreme Court someday soon were to cut
back on standing that stemmed from a broad decision of a very different
1972 Supreme Court. But the City Human Rights Law should not be cut
back in tandem. Even before the 1991 Amendments, the City Human
Rights Law had been interpreted by the Commission on Human Rights to
have intended the broadest possible standing. Citing Trafficante and
Havens, the Commission concluded that, just as the Supreme Court had
ruled that Congress had intended “to define standing as broadly as is
including the addition of “organizations” within its ambit. See 1991 LEG. ANN., supra note
4, at 145.
278. William Meade Fletcher, 2 FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS § 434 (2005) (“That a corporation can act only through agents is too
elementary a proposition to require the citation of authority.”).
279. In Havens itself, the fair housing organization based its own claim for standing, and
it was granted on the grounds that the defendant’s conduct has forced it into a “diversion of
resources” and had caused “frustration of mission.” Havens, 455 U.S. at 378-380. The fact
that fair housing organizations have thereafter fit their cases into a “diversion of resources”
or “frustration of mission” box does not alter the availability of standing under Havens for
all ‘persons’ discriminatorily denied truthful information.
280. Village of Bellwood v. Dwivedi, 895 F.2d 1521, 1526 (7th Cir. 1990).
281. Housing and Community Development Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1615 (1992).
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permitted by Article III of the Constitution,”282 the City Human Rights
Law echoes this construction by the inclusion of [language] which provides
that this title ‘shall be construed liberally for the accomplishment of the
purposes thereof’.” 283
Because the kind of analysis engaged in by Trafficante and Havens
broadly considered an all-encompassing anti-discrimination goal, that
analysis can usefully be seen “as a floor below which the City Human
Rights Law cannot fall.” 284 Moreover, the issue of maintaining broad
standing was specifically put before the Council in testimony and
statements as one of the goals and consequences of passing the Restoration
Act. 285 Regardless of what the Supreme Court comes to do, both testers
and fair housing organizations should be found to have standing under the
City Human Rights Law for the discriminatory deprivation of truthful
information regarding available housing.
5. Overcoming the inhibition effect
Civil rights advocates have been on the defensive for so long that it is
sometimes hard to imagine that fruitful new legal territory is available to be
utilized. The Restoration Act is both a response to advocates who sought
new momentum in the fight against discrimination, and a call to others to
take up this fight with renewed vigor. The illustrations discussed below
each arise from statutory language, or were referenced in testimony in the
course of consideration of the Restoration Act.

282. Folan v. Festinger, No. 92681-H, 1983 WL 207649, at *7 (N.Y.C. Com. Hum. Rts.,
Dec. 22, 1983) (decision and order) (quoting Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409
U.S. 205, 209 (1972)).
283. Id. A decision contemporaneous with the adoption of the 1991 Amendments stated
that it is “well settled that the use of testers is an investigative tool looked upon with favor
by federal and state courts, and by this Commission.” Childs v. Milman, No. FH
167052489, 1991 WL 790571, at *12 (N.Y.C. Com. Hum. Rts., Oct. 25, 1991)
(recommended decision and order), adopted by No. FH 167052489DH, 1992 WL 814977
(N.Y.C. Com. Hum. Rts., Apr. 8, 1992) (decision and order ).
284. See Restoration Act, supra note 7, § 1.
285. See Center Testimony, supra note 23, at 4 (“We will be able to protect against the
time when federal courts cut back on standing for testers and for fair housing
organizations.”); see also Brennan Center Statement, supra note 23, at 7 (“Rather than being
reactive—waiting, for example, until after the Supreme Court cuts back on standing for
testers and fair housing organizations, and then waiting further, for the years it frequently
takes to achieve a specific legislative restoration—Intro 22 will provide a means of
preventing such dismantling of New York City’s civil rights protections from occurring in
the first place.”).
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i. Discrimination in the delivery of City services
The assertion is frequently made that there are gross disparities in the
delivery of City services (and in the burden of City infrastructure)
depending on the neighborhood in which one lives. 286 Because New York
City is so highly segregated, 287 such neighborhood variations would yield
strong racial disparities. 288
Because the City Human Rights Law defines public accommodations to
include a provider of any and all services, 289 and because the City is not
excluded from that definition, 290 the delivery of City services is open to a
challenge pursuant to the distinctive disparate impact provisions of the

286. See NYC Environmental Justice Alliance, http://www.nyceja.org/campaigns.html
(last visited Jan. 10, 2006) (“New York City has one of the lowest standards of open space
access (acres per 1000 residents) in the United States. . . . 37 of 59 community districts
(63%), more than previously thought, are not meeting the standard of 2.5 acres per 1000
residents with regard to access to open space. Of these 37 districts, 24 have the highest
number of residents of color (65% or more) and 18 are of the lowest median household
income ($16,000-$30,000). These communities are also the one’s [sic] carrying the rest of
the City’s environmental burdens from waste transfer stations to power plants.”).
287. See, e.g., JOHN ICELAND ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE,
RACIAL AND ETHNIC RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION IN THE UNITED STATES: 1980-2000, at 85-87
(2002) (finding that the New York primary metropolitan statistical area, which encompasses
New York City, as well as Westchester, Putnam, and Rockland Counties, was the single
most segregated major metropolitan area in the United States for Hispanics and Latinos);
see also Current-Day Segregation in New York City, Analysis of Census 2000 Data and
Maps by Professor Andrew A. Beveridge for the Anti-Discrimination Center of Metro New
York, available at www.antibiaslaw.com/nycseg.pdf.
288. The existence of educational segregation, for example, is a direct function of
residential segregation. See, e.g., GARY ORFIELD ET AL., DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION: THE
QUIET REVERSAL OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 329 (1996) (“The school segregation
that exists in any given community today shows the enduring effects of practices and
expectations rooted in past discrimination in housing.”). The disparities in the education
system have been the subject of constant criticism, including even criticism from those
running the system. See, e.g., Chancellor Joel Klein, New York City Dep’t of Ed., Remarks
at a “Teach for America” Dinner (May 19, 2004) (“It is clear to me that the purpose that
animated and compelled [Brown v. Board of Education] is not being fulfilled here in New
York City—or across our nation. We have not remedied the broad disparities in either
educational opportunities or student achievement that were the driving force behind Brown.
These disparities deprive our children of equality. They restrict children’s life choices.
That is wrong. And it is a stark reminder that the fight for civil rights in this country is not
over.”).
289. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-102(9).
290. On the contrary, the Committee Report accompanying the 1991 Amendments
pointed out the City schools would be covered by the public accommodations provision.
See 1991 COMMITTEE REPORT ANALYSIS, supra note 81, at 4 (“The amendment would also
eliminate the current exclusion of public libraries, schools, colleges, and other educational
institutions. . . .
Although a variety of other laws . . . cover certain aspects of
discrimination . . . the City has an independent and overriding interest in routing out
discrimination from its schools.”).

GURIAN_CHRISTENSEN

162

2/3/2011 10:12 PM

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XXXIII

law. 291
ii. Limiting the circumstances where punitive damages can be evaded
Under the Kolstad standard, good faith compliance measures that are
taken by a covered entity act as a safe harbor against punitive damages
under federal law. 292 In contrast, the currently operative provision of the
City Human Rights Law, explicitly provides that such good faith measures
only mitigate liability for punitive damages. 293 Courts have assumed that
other aspects of Kolstad—like the requisite mental state required for the
imposition of punitive damages, and who has to have that mental state—are
areas where the City Human Rights Law tracks the federal standard. 294 In
fact, no court has engaged in an independent assessment of whether these
aspects of Kolstad actually serve the purposes of the City Human Rights
Law.
In terms of the required mental state, Kolstad requires that a defendant
have acted in reckless disregard of a perceived risk that its actions will
violate civil rights law.295 Given the City Human Rights Law’s overriding
concern that covered entities be made to recognize the seriousness with
which they must take their obligations, advocates will likely question why
a defendant who recklessly disregards the risk that its conduct will harm
the plaintiff should not, as a matter of local law, be liable for punitive
damages. 296 Such conduct is blameworthy regardless of whether the
defendant is disregarding, as required by Kolstad, a known risk of violating
the law. 297
In terms of who must possess the requisite culpable mental state, Kolstad
limits the class for federal law purposes to managerial employees.298

291. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-107(17).
292. Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 546 (1999).
293. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-107(13)(e).
294. E.g., Farias v. Instructional Sys., Inc., 259 F.3d 91, 101-02 (2d Cir. 2001) (federal
law is not adopted where City law (as in the case of mitigation of punitives) has explicitly
adopted a standard different from the federal standard, but federal law is adopted where City
law is silent).
295. Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 536.
296. Where a defendant intends that its conduct harm the plaintiff, of course, the question
of reckless disregard does not come into play, and punitive damages are properly founded
on a theory of malice. Kolstad did nothing to upset that aspect of the law. Id. (describing
recklessness as an alternative to a showing of malice or “evil motive or intent”).
297. This issue was brought to the Council’s attention through the testimony of the AntiDiscrimination Center. See Center Testimony, supra note 23, at 4.
298. Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 542-43 (noting that a managerial employee must be an
“important” employee); id. at 546. Of course, when the employer itself participates in
harassment, where the discriminatory acts are quintessentially employer acts, or where the
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Restricting the universe of those for whom an employer may be held liable
in punitive damages to managerial employees, however, is a restriction
contrary to the choice made by the City Human Rights Law. The vicarious
liability provisions do not by their terms exclude any type of damages from
the application of the principle of vicarious responsibility. 299 Moreover,
the employer in the housing or public accommodations context become
automatically liable based on the conduct of the employee or agent, without
The employer in the workplace context becomes
limitation. 300
automatically liable based on the conduct of the employee or agent who
exercises supervisory or managerial authority, without limitation.301 These
provisions reflect an overriding concern of the City Human Rights Law that
employers are obliged to take all reasonable steps to prevent their
employees and agents from discriminating. The potential of having
punitive damages imposed based solely on the mental state of the employee
gives the employer added incentive not only to disseminate antidiscrimination policies, but to make sure they are effectively policed. 302
PART II: THE OTHER PROVISIONS OF THE RESTORATION ACT
Though the need for broad and independent interpretation of the City
Human Rights Law was of paramount importance in drafting the
Restoration Act, there are specific changes rendered by the Act that are
themselves of great importance.
A. Retaliation
The Second Circuit’s “materiality” standard for an action to be adverse
is rejected. The Restoration Act provides that retaliation:

participant is sufficiently high in the employer’s organization to be considered an alter ego
of the employer, the employer is more properly said to directly liable. Faragher, 524 U.S.
at 788-90. Direct liability analysis can extend to the imposition of punitive damages. Cf.
Deters v. Equifax Credit Info. Svcs., Inc., 202 F.3d 1262, 1269-70 (10th Cir. 2000)
(company directly liable in punitives because of reckless indifference on the part of the
employee it designated to respond to complaints of discrimination).
299. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE §§ 8-107(13)(a),(b), and (c).
300. See id. § 8-107(13)(a).
301. See id. § 8-107(13)(b)(1).
302. The local law’s emphasis of maximizing effective policing of policies is reflected in
the fact that the “good faith” factors for mitigation of punitive damages specify that the
required policies must be policies for the prevention “and detection” of discrimination. Id. §
8-107(13)(d)(1). One such policy that is specified is one that has “[p]rocedures for the
supervision of employees and agents and for the oversight of persons employed as
independent contractors specifically directed at the prevention and detection of
[discriminatory] practices.” Id. § 8-107(13)(d)(1)(iv) (emphasis added).
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need not result in an ultimate action with respect to employment, housing
or a public accommodation or in a materially adverse change in the terms
and conditions of employment, housing, or a public accommodation,
provided, however, that the retaliatory or discriminatory act or acts
complained of must be reasonably likely to deter a person from engaging
in protected activity. 303

The Committee Report explicitly states that the amendment:
would make clear that the standard to be applied to retaliation claims
under the City’s differs from the standard currently applied by the Second
Circuit in retaliation claims made pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964; it is in line with the standard set out in guidelines of the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and applied to retaliation
claims by federal courts in several other circuits. 304

The EEOC Guidelines take the position that the “degree of harm
suffered by the individual ‘goes to the issue of damages, not liability.’”305
The Guidelines explain the policy reasons for this view in terms
remarkably similar to those that animated the Restoration Act:
This broad view of coverage accords with the primary purpose of the antiretaliation provisions, which is to ‘[m]aintain[] unfettered access to
statutory remedial mechanisms.’ Regardless of the degree or quality of
harm to the particular complainant, retaliation harms the public interest by
deterring others from filing a charge. An interpretation of Title VII that
permits some forms of retaliation to go unpunished would undermine the
effectiveness of the EEOC statutes and conflict with the language and
purpose of the anti-retaliation provisions. 306

As such, many manifestations of retaliation that would not
necessarily meet a materiality standard, do meet the EEOC test. The
Committee Report that accompanied the Restoration Act noted that “lateral
transfers, unfavorable job references, and change in work schedules” would
be among the conduct that would be actionable under the test contemplated
by the Restoration Act. 307
When construing the enhanced retaliation provision, it is important
to remember that the 1991 Amendments had already sought to broaden
303. Restoration Act, supra note 7, § 3, amending N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-107(7).
304. 2005 COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 22, at 3.
305. 2 EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 8, 13 (1998) (internal citation omitted), available
at eeoc.gov/policy/docs/retal.pdf.
306. Id. at 8-15 (internal citations omitted).
307. 2005 COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 22, at 3 n.4, (citing a review of the state of the
law in Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1241-43 (9th Cir. 2000)). Another case cited in
Ray found that an employer’s “cancellation of a public event honoring an employee” could
constitute actionable conduct. Ray, 217 F.3d at 1242.
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coverage by adding to the then-existing anti-retaliation section a phrase that
attempted to make clear that it was illegal to retaliate “in any manner.”308
Combined with the policy grounds for the EEOC’s position, cited with
approval by the 2005 Committee Report, as well as with the Restoration
Act’s own goal to ensure “that New York City does everything within its
power to identify and root out discrimination,” 309 it is clear that the
Restoration Act’s “reasonably likely to deter” standard is intended to cover
a very wide range of conduct.
There may well be some types of conduct, which, if examined
without regard to chilling effect, might not, at first blush, seem more than
trivial. But a useful question to be posed is this: “What would happen if
the policy manual of the covered entity being sued had stated that
opposition to discrimination would be responded to by the retaliatory
conduct that the covered entity was proved to have engaged in?” 310 If the
response publicized were simply that the employee’s supervisor would be
less effusively friendly for a few days, it is not likely that any employees
would be deterred from opposing discrimination in the future. But, if the
“full advance disclosure of retaliation” manual explained that the cost of
opposing discrimination would be the loss of all future social intercourse
with other employees, the workplace reality would be that some people—
indeed, many people—would become less likely to oppose discrimination
than they otherwise would be. And the chilling effect would take place
even in the absence of any fear of discharge, demotion, transfer, or poor
references. The need to make a real world evaluation of how a particular
type of conduct (in particular circumstances) would be perceived is another
case where the determination is best suited to a jury after trial, not to a
judge on a summary judgment motion.
B. Domestic Partnership
The Restoration Act prohibits discrimination on the basis of
“partnership status” across all contexts of discrimination covered by the
City Human Rights Law. “Partnership status” means the status of being in
a “domestic partnership,” as that term is already defined under New York
City law. An individual can be in a domestic partnership, and thus have

308. 1991 Amendments, supra note 3, §1, amending N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-107(7)
(1989); see 1991 LEG. ANN, supra note 4, at 160.
309. 2005 COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 22, at 4.
310. It is worth noting here that it is only where a covered entity has intentionally taken
some action against a plaintiff because of opposition to discrimination, and the plaintiff has
proven that a causal link exists between the opposition and the action in response, that a
defendant faces liability.
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partnership status, as can a couple. The 2005 Committee Report
specifically states that “life partners” and others who are domestic partners
under New York City law are to “receive protection from all forms of
discrimination addressed by the human rights law, just as married partners
do.” 311
Health insurance and other employer-provided benefits are clearly
“terms, conditions or privileges of employment,” and, hence, the terms of
the operative provision of the City Human Rights Law are applicable to a
covered entity’s refusal to provide such insurance or benefits to domestic
partners. Claims will undoubtedly be made that the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA) preempts the local law in this one respect. It
is beyond the scope of this article to attempt to resolve the preemption
question, 312 but the way that City Law itself handles the question is
instructive.
The 1991 Amendments provided that the employment
discrimination provisions as they related to employee benefit plans “shall
not be construed to preclude an employer from observing the requirements
of [an ERISA plan] that is in compliance with applicable federal
discrimination laws where the application of [the City Law provision]
would be preempted by such act.” 313 On one level, this language may
seem unnecessary: if there were federal preemption, that preemption would
operate regardless of whether a state or local statute explicitly referenced it.
On another level, however, the provision demonstrates that City Law made
a conscious choice to go as far as permissible. The only limit being
imposed was any limit that existed by the operation of preemption, and no
additional limitation should be inferred.
C. Catalyst Case Fees
Buckhannon 314 is rejected for City Human Rights Law purposes. As
amended, section 8-502(f) of the New York City Human Rights Law
specifies that a prevailing party who may be awarded costs and fees
“includes a plaintiff whose commencement of litigation has acted as a

311. 2005 COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 22, at 2-3 (emphasis added).
312. Given that the City Human Rights Law does not seek to specify the substance of
coverage to be provided, does not seek to regulate the administration of the benefits
program, and does not cause a burden to plan administrators, one would imagine that the
argument against section 1144 preemption to be strong. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (2005).
313. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-107(e)(i) (emphasis added); 1991 LEG. ANN., supra note 3,
at 152.
314. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health, 532 U.S. 598
(2001).
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catalyst to effect policy change on the part of the defendant, regardless of
whether that change has been implemented voluntarily, as a result of a
settlement or as a result of a judgment in such plaintiff’s favor.”315 The
change is another example of the Council wanting to make certain that the
law in no way discourages individuals and organizations from playing a
vigorous private attorney general role.
D. Civil Penalties
When civil penalties were introduced to the City Human Rights Law in
1991, they were designed to vindicate the public interest, and were
available up to $50,000 even where there had been no showing of
willfulness or maliciousness, and up to $100,000 where there had been
such a showing. 316 A problem that emerged was that the caps were too low
to achieve their purpose of vindicating the public interest. In a case of
harassment of a person with AIDS several years ago, the appellate court
reduced the Commission-imposed civil penalty from $75,000 to $25,000,
even though it believed that the defendant had acted abhorrently.317
Nevertheless, because the landlord was not one of the City’s largest, the
court cut the penalty. 318 The pre-Restoration Act caps thus acted not only
to prevent adequate punishment of larger wrongdoers; they also worked to
ratchet down penalties for smaller wrongdoers below what is appropriate.
The Restoration Act raises the caps to $125,000 without a showing
of willfulness or maliciousness, and to $250,000 to such a showing. 319 The
Council intended that these higher civil penalties reflect the fact that all
acts of discrimination cause serious injury both to the individual victim and
to the City, 320 and that these higher penalties will demonstrate that
discrimination “will not be tolerated.” 321
The fact that the caps were more than doubled should also be a

315. Restoration Act, supra note 8, § 8, amending N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-502(f); see
also 2005 COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 22, at n.10 (citing the dissent of Justice Ginsburg
in Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 627-28, and explaining that an analysis of the entitlement to
costs and fees in a catalyst case can be based “on a three part analysis, which requires: (1)
that the respondent provide at least some of the benefit sought by the lawsuit; (2) that the
suit stated a genuine claim; and (3) that the suit was a substantial or significant cause of the
act providing the relief”).
316. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-126(a); 1991 LEG. ANN., supra note 3, at 174.
317. Matter of 119-121 E. 97th St. Corp. v. N.Y.C. Comm’n on Human Rights, 642
N.Y.S.2d 638, 644 (App. Div. 1996).
318. Id.
319. Restoration Act, supra note 8, § 6.
320. 2005 COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 22, at 6.
321. Id.
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factor in restraining judges who might otherwise be inclined to reduce
punitive damage awards in cases brought in court. A 250 percent increase
in penalties available administratively strongly suggests that it is actually
the award of “inadequate penalties” that is the key problem about which
courts need to worry. Likewise, the Council’s emphasis on the societal
injury caused by discrimination should make judges skeptical that punitive
awards are excessive. Punitive damages can only meet the law’s goals of
punishment, individual deterrence, and general deterrence if they are
sufficient to “sting.”
There are what purport to be constitutional limitations on the size of
punitive damage awards.322 One of the factors to be considered in “due
process excessiveness” analysis is a comparison of the punitive damages
awarded with the civil penalties available for similar conduct. In BMW of
North America, Inc. v. Gore, the case that established the factors cited by
State Farm, there was a $2,000,000 punitive damage award.323 That award
represented an amount one thousand times the maximum civil penalty that
could have been imposed by the state’s Deceptive Trade Practices Act, a
ratio that the Court found to be strongly indicative of excessiveness.324
Under the City Human Rights Law as revised by the Restoration Act, by
contrast, that $2,000,000 punitive damage award would only represent an
amount eight times the amount that can now be imposed
administratively. 325 Both in terms of conveying the seriousness with which
the City views discriminatory conduct, and by reducing the ratio between
maximum civil penalties on the one hand and punitive damage awards
measured in the millions of dollars on the other, the Restoration Act has
made larger punitive damage awards more sustainable.

322. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 418, 425 (2003)
(Interal citations omitted) (To determine whether a punitive damage award is excessive and
violates the Due Process Clause, it is necessary to consider three factors, the most important
of which is the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s misconduct; also to be
considered is “the disparity between the actual or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff
and the punitive damages award,” although a greater ratio may be necessary where the
“monetary value of noneconomic harms might have been difficult to determine”; and, lastly,
“the difference between the punitive damages awarded by the jury and the civil penalties
authorized or imposed in comparable cases.”). But see id. at 430-31 (Ginsburg, J.
dissenting) (internal citations omitted) (“It was not until 1996 . . . that the Court, for the first
time, invalidated a state-court punitive damages assessment as unreasonably large. . . . If our
activity in this domain is now “well established” [as claimed by the majority], it takes place
on ground not long held.”).
323. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 567 (1996).
324. Id.
325. Restoration Act, supra note 7, § 6.
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E. Thorough Investigations
Citing a report on the City’s failure to enforce its Human Rights Law,326
the Council imposed a requirement that the administrative investigations of
the Commission on Human Rights be “thorough.” 327 Among the many
problems that the report had found was the fact that the Commission had
been engaging “in a process of what might be called ‘asymmetrical
skepticism.’” 328 “No probable cause determinations” repeatedly rely
on the idea that a complainant has not “rebutted” the contentions of the
respondent—contentions generally contained in an answer or position
statement prepared by respondent’s counsel. In essence, the Commission
will say to an (almost always unrepresented) individual: “Go ahead and
disprove what respondent’s counsel has written.” The respondent’s
attorney’s position winds up being treated as true unless conclusively
proven false by complainant, without that position ever being challenged
directly by Commission inquiry. 329

The Committee Report specified that, in general, the “thorough”
investigation requirement “should include steps such as probing the reasons
for a respondent’s conduct and actively seeking out facts from
witnesses.” 330 As such, the new requirement—in addition to causing the
Commission to changes its practices—should mean that state courts
reviewing challenges to determinations by the Commission need to be
more probing in assessing whether an investigative determination was
based on adequate investigation.
F. Technical Changes
Even if a complaint had previously been filed with the State Division of
Human Rights, the City Human Rights Law had permitted an action to be
commenced under its provisions if the State complaint had first been
dismissed by the State Division for “administrative convenience.”331
Subsequent to the 1991 Amendments, the State Human Rights Law was
changed to permit an “annulment” of a complainant’s election of

326. See 2005 COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 22, at 4 n.5 (citing CRAIG GURIAN, ANTIDISCRIMINATION CENTER OF METRO NEW YORK, AT THE CROSSROADS: IS THERE HOPE FOR
CIVIL RIGHTS LAW ENFORCEMENT IN NEW YORK? 6-10 (2003), available at
www.antibiaslaw.com/crossroads.pdf.
327. Restoration Act, supra note 7, § 4, amending N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-109(g).
328. GURIAN, supra note 326, at 9.
329. Id.
330. 2005 COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 22, at 4 n.6.
331. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-502(b).
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remedies. 332 The Restoration Act makes clear that such annulments revive
an aggrieved party’s right to bring a claim under the City Human Rights
Law as well. 333
The 1991 Amendments required that, prior to an action being
commenced pursuant to the City Human Rights Law, a copy of the
complaint had to be filed with the City Commission and with the City’s
Law Department. The purpose was to make certain that the responsible
local institutional entities tasked to fight discrimination would remain
apprised of (and potentially intervene in) claims of discrimination. Courts
have understood that the purpose was not to create a jurisdictional
barrier. 334 The Restoration Act modifies the provision to permit the
serving of copies of the complaints on the agencies within ten days after
the commencement of a civil action, and requires the agencies to designate
a representative to receive the complaints. 335 The use of the term “serve”
was not and is not intended to convey a technical meaning. The purpose is
that the complaint is received by the agencies, regardless of the means
used. 336
PART III: ADDITIONAL ISSUES FOR IMMEDIATE RESOLUTION
A. Retroactivity
The Restoration Act has no explicit retroactivity provision; it says only
that it is to take effect immediately upon enactment. 337 Nevertheless, New
York’s Court of Appeals balances two axioms of statutory interpretation in
making a determination about retroactivity:
Amendments are presumed to have prospective application unless the
Legislature’s preference for retroactivity is explicitly stated or clearly
indicated. However, remedial legislation should be given retroactive
effect in order to effectuate its beneficial purpose. Other factors in the
retroactivity analysis include whether the Legislature has made a specific
pronouncement about retroactive effect or conveyed a sense of urgency;

332. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 297(9) (McKinney 2005).
333. Restoration Act, supra note 7, § 8, amending N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-502(b).
334. See, e.g., Teller v. Am. W. Airlines, Inc., N.Y.S.2d 314, 315 (App. Div. 1997)
(provision is designed to provide notice to agencies and failure to comply is not bar to
action); Bernstein v. 1995 Assocs., 630 N.Y.S.2d 68, 71-72 (App. Div. 1995) (same).
335. Restoration Act, supra note 7, § 8, amending N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-502(c).
336. Hence, it is contemplated that delivering the copy of the complaint by mail or by
overnight delivery service is permissible, without a party first having attempted in-person
delivery.
337. Restoration Act, supra note 7, § 12.
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whether the statute was designed to rewrite an unintended judicial
interpretation; and whether the enactment itself reaffirms a legislative
judgment about what the law in question should be. 338

Two of the Restoration Act’s provisions are entirely new, and thus will
have prospective application only. These are the provision adding
domestic partnership as a new basis of protected class status, and the
provision increasing the maximum civil penalties that can be awarded in
the administrative context. 339 The rest of the provisions, on the other hand,
are appropriately applied retroactively. 340
The two areas of the Restoration Act where retroactivity will be
contested are the retaliation provision and the enhanced liberal construction
provision. In both cases, the Restoration Act was “designed to rewrite an
unintended judicial interpretation” and “reaffirms a legislative judgment
about what the law in question should be.” 341 The Restoration Act and its
legislative history are replete with references to the need for clarification
and reaffirmation. 342 The text of the Act itself states that “it is the sense of
the Council that New York City’s Human Rights Law has been construed
too narrowly to ensure protection of all persons covered by the law.”343
The 2005 Committee Report states that the Act “aims to ensure
construction of the City’s Human Rights Law in line with the purposes of
fundamental amendments to the law enacted in 1991.”344
Specifically with respect to retaliation, the 2005 Committee Report
states that the point of the amendment is “to clarify the standard.”345 This
clarifying intention is highlighted specifically by the fact that the 1991
Amendments had already attempted to broaden coverage by prohibiting
retaliation “in any manner.” 346 Here, as in Gleason, “the legislative history
establishes that the purpose of the amendment was to clarify what the law

338. In re Gleason, 749 N.E.2d 724, 726 (N.Y. 2001).
339. Where conduct that predates the effective date of the Restoration Act continues on
after the effective date, of course, the higher maximums apply.
340. Retroactivity in terms of the filing provisions and the requirement of “thorough”
investigations is routine, and does not warrant discussion.
341. In re Gleason, 96 N.Y.2d at 122.
342. In both cases, the law conveys a sense of urgency as well. Unlike the 1991
Amendments, which the Council clearly had in view, the Restoration Act does not contain
any deferring language. See 1991 Amendments, supra note 3, § 4; 1991 LEG. ANN., supra
note 3, at 180 (setting forth deferred application of some provisions, and explicitly stating
that several others were to be applied prospectively only).
343. Restoration Act, supra note 7, § 1.
344. 2005 COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 22, at 2.
345. Id. at 3.
346. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-107(7); 1991 LEG. ANN., supra note 3, at 160.
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was always meant to do and say.” 347
A covered entity that has taken negative action against a person prior to
the effective date of the Restoration Act cannot be heard to complain of
retroactive application on the ground that the retaliation did not rise to the
“materiality standard.” Such conduct not only comes under the local law’s
1991 “in any manner” language, it is conduct as to which the covered entity
had no legitimate or vested interest.348
The enhanced liberal construction provision, of course, has application
across the range of all provisions of the local law, and there is no difficulty
concluding that the purpose of the provision “was to clarify what the law
was always meant to do and say,” at least what it was always meant to do
and say after the 1991 Amendments. The 2005 Committee Report, for
example, not only states that the Restoration Act “aims to ensure
construction of the City’s Human Rights Law in line with the purposes of
fundamental amendments to the law enacted in 1991,” it pointedly
incorporates Mayor Dinkins’ contemporaneous recitation of the Council’s
intent in 1991 to require liberal and independent construction of the law. 349
For most provisions of the City Human Rights Law, there was either not
a specific interpretation of the language of the City Human Rights Law
provision 350—let alone one according with the existing liberal construction
requirement—or an interpretation rendered by the State Court of Appeals.
As such, decisions that henceforth determine what the law properly “was”
in respect to these provisions in the period from the 1991 Amendments to
the enactment of the Restoration Act would not, in most cases even involve
the “overruling” of a decision of the State’s highest court, but rather would
involve either a simple reading of the substantive statutory language or the
application of the pre-Restoration Act liberal construction provision.
Retroactive application concerning such “under-interpreted” provisions of
the City law cannot be said to upset “settled expectations.”
Decisions that have been rendered by the Court of Appeals which have
not considered the language or purpose of the City statute not only fail to
meet the requirements of amended section 8-130, they failed to meet the
liberal construction requirements of the pre-Restoration Act City Human
347. In re Gleason, 96 N.Y.2d at 122.
348. The argument to the contrary, that covered entities were somehow relying on the
materiality loophole, that is, they were justified in trying to take retaliatory action as close to
the line as possible, is not a value to be countenanced under the City Human Rights Law.
One hopes, in any event, that it will be an argument that induces the Second Circuit to
rethink the utility and appropriateness of its own standard.
349. 2005 COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 22, at 2.
350. For example, the Court of Appeals in Levin simply did not interpret the “terms and
conditions” provision of the statute.
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Rights Law. As such, allowing such decisions to govern any proceedings,
including proceedings relating to conduct that occurred prior to October 3,
2005, would defeat the remedial purposes not only of the Restoration Act,
but of the 1991 Amendments as well.
It is important to note that retroactive application cannot seriously be
said to impair any “vested interest” of any individual or entity subject to the
law. In terms of vicarious liability, for example, a covered entity either did
or did not have a vested interest in encouraging, condoning, or furthering
harassing conduct by an employee. If it did not, it cannot claim a vested
interest in Forrest’s failure to apply the plain language of section 8107(13)(b)(1) of the New York City Human Rights Law. If the covered
entity did have a vested interest in encouraging, condoning, or furthering
such harassing conduct, it is in any event liable under existing State Human
Rights Law principles, and is not harmed by application of City law
liability stemming in any event from 1991 Amendments language.
There is, finally, an important issue of avoiding confusion in the
administration of justice that counsels retroactive application. If courts
were to begin to decide cases based on old notions of what the law “was”—
as opposed to what the Restoration Act clarified the law was intended to
be—we will likely be faced with a new series of decisions that fail to
engage in the analysis required by the Restoration Act, the routine citation
of which will lead to a failure to take the necessary new steps to determine
what, post-Restoration Act, the law “is” hereafter supposed to be.
B. Jury Instructions
Developing and promulgating model jury instructions for cases
implicating provisions of the City’s Human Rights Law is a task that
warrants urgent attention. It is clear that some City Human Rights Law
standards already differ from their state and federal counterparts. More
will come to differ as judges begin to construe provisions to accomplish the
uniquely broad and remedial purposes of the City law. Still others will
come to differ as federal law becomes more narrow and, thanks to the
Restoration Act, City law resists being ratcheted down. As such, existing
instructions need to be thoroughly reviewed: they reflect the carbon copy
bias that the Restoration Act seeks to eliminate.
Instructions distinguishing the proof requirements of the City Human
Rights Law from those of counterpart civil rights statutes should not be
difficult to develop.351 Nevertheless, it may be useful to consider the

351. In a case where the retaliation alleged arguably does not meet the federal materiality
standard, for example, a judge would point out that the City Human Rights Law claim does
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increased use of special interrogatories. Take, for example, a case where
Jane Smith alleges that her supervisor, John Jones, sexually harassed her.
Smith brings an EEOC charge against her employer, ABC Corporation, but
not against Jones, because individuals are not liable under Title VII. After
the EEOC fails to investigate her charge in 180 days, plaintiff Smith
commences an action in United States District Court for the Eastern or
Southern District of New York alleging that ABC violated her rights under
Title VII and the City Human Rights Law, and that Jones violated her
rights under the latter statute. Because the City Human Rights Law permits
individuals to be held responsible for their discriminatory acts, 352 and
because there is a common core of operative facts, the federal court
assumes supplemental jurisdiction of the City Human Rights Law claim,
both as against ABC and as against Jones.
Assume that it has come to be recognized that the City Human Rights
Law should not insulate defendants who have engaged in harassment by
imposing
a
“severe
or
pervasive”
hurdle over which to jump, and the alternative formulation suggested
earlier in this article has been accepted. 353 Assume as well that the
presiding judge has read the strict liability provisions of section 8107(13)(b)(1). There are basic ways in which instructions relating to the
two statutes would need to differ, and for which special interrogatories
would be helpful. 354
The jury would be asked, “Did plaintiff demonstrate that Jones treated
her less favorably because of gender?” If the answer were “no,” then
judgment would be entered for both defendants on all claims.
If the answer were yes, the jury would be asked, “Did defendants
demonstrate that the conduct alleged consisted of merely petty slights or
trivial annoyances? If the answer to this question were “yes,” then
judgment would be entered for both defendants on all claims.

not require a showing that the retaliation complained of resulted in an ultimate employment
action or a materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of employment, and would
further explain that a plaintiff in that circumstance would need to prove that that the
retaliatory act or acts complained of were reasonably likely to deter an employee from
engaging in protected activity.
352. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-107(1)(a); see supra notes 75–90 and accompanying text.
353. See supra notes 190–213 and accompanying text for a discussion of the proposal
that all harassment should be proscribed except where the covered entity proves as an
affirmative defense that the challenged actions “consisted of no more than what a reasonable
victim of discrimination would consider petty slights and trivial annoyances.”
354. This illustration also assumes that the evidence only supports a single motive
charge. Potential differences in the definition of “supervisor” under the two laws, and a
variety of differences relating to the imposition of punitive damages are also among the
issues not treated here.
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If the answer to the second question were “no,” then plaintiff would
have judgment against Jones on the City Human Rights Law claim.
The third question that the jury would need to answer would be, “Did
Smith exercise supervisory responsibility for ABC?” If the answer to this
question were “yes,” then plaintiff would have judgment against ABC on
the City Human Rights Law claim.
There would only remain questions relating to the Title VII claim
against ABC. One relates to whether the conduct alleged was sufficiently
severe or pervasive to create a hostile environment. If the answer to this
question were “no,” then judgment would be entered for ABC on the Title
VII claim.
If the answer to the “severe or pervasive” question were “yes,” then a
question would need to be posed as to whether defendant had made out
both prongs of the Faragher/Ellerth defense. A “yes” answer from the jury
would yield judgment for ABC on the Title VII claim; an answer of “no”
would yield judgment for plaintiff against ABC on the Title VII claim.
Special interrogatories such as these will make it simpler for juries (and
judges) to navigate the variety of different standards set out by City, State,
and federal civil rights law.
CONCLUSION
There may well be those who say that the 1991 Amendments and the
Restoration Act represent a series of policy choices that are distinctly too
plaintiff-friendly; that are insufficiently attentive to the needs of covered
entities; and that rely too much on a law enforcement model of detect,
punish, and deter. In her or his private life, a judge is free to vote for City
Council candidates who would make different policy choices. In the
meantime, the only lawful and responsible course of judicial action is to
respect the policy choices that have been made. These choices respect and
honor the unique ability of judges to take center stage in the advance of
social justice by the simple and profound task of giving “thoughtful,
independent consideration” to what interpretation would best fulfill “the
uniquely broad and remedial purposes of the City’s Human Rights
Law.” 355
The fact that few have thus far awakened to the potential of the City
Human Rights Law in the fifteen years since this passage of the 1991
Amendments must not and does not change this obligation. It remains a
sad fact of our history that Reconstruction Era civil rights statutes went
unenforced for many decades. Yet, as a Supreme Court that finally
355. 2005 COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 22, at 5 n.8.
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recognized its obligation to give life to Section 1982 wrote: “The fact that
the statute lay partially dormant for many years cannot be held to diminish
its force today.” 356

356. Jones v. Mayer, 392 U.S. 409, 437 (1968).

